Syrian Dialogue Center

The National Consensus Index

Second Edition

Contents

What is the National Consensus Index?:

The Syrian Opposition has always been accused of being divided in its discourse and stances on all of the events affecting the general situation in Syria, whether that be political stances or stances related to all of the issues on the humanitarian and military levels or to the movements of foreign individual states.

This has created a general perception that the Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces very rarely unite on one opinion or stance, especially in light of their constant stumble to find an objective or systematic reference to find consensus on.

Therefore, in congruence with the Syrian Dialogue Center's message in achieving integration, coexistence and guiding the national will, the center decided to establish a metric to test the degree of consensus between the Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces through launching "The National Consensus Index." The index is a numeric index which monitors and analyzes the declared stances of a number of actors on the ground in Syria towards the most prominent events and political stances-without an objective evaluation-in its biannual issues.

The index aims to measure the degree of consensus in the different military and political stances of different ideological leanings, which leads to specific positions through following their individual stances and opinions on all of the important issues throughout the time period at hand (half a year). This gives researchers and people interested in the Syrian issue clear and real indicators on the general leanings of these forces.

After the previous prototype issue which covered the first half of the year 2018, this report as the "Second Edition" focuses on the second half of 2018.

We hope that this biannual report will motivate the Syrian forces to dialogue and coordinate amongst themselves, which will lead to a greater degree of consensus in their stances on the important issues in this painful stages of the Syrian nation's life. We also hope that its participates in raising the general political awareness of the Syrian people through getting to know the existing forces on the ground and their general stances and leanings and degree of consensus.

Introduction

In the second half of 2018, Syria did not witness any essential changes on the political and military levels on the ground. The military map remained as it was with the exception of the changes in the regions under the control of Daesh, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's spread in the Idlib Governorate and the areas surrounding it. On the political level, there was no advance in the issue of a political settlement, including that of the Constitutional Committee. However, this did not prevent the occurrence of events related to the political and military levels, indicating the fluid situation that Syria continues to see.

This period witnessed the suggestion of a roadmap for the return of Syrian refugees on the part of Russia, and a military escalation in the Idlib Governorate, it has then lately took up the Sochi agreement between itself and Turkey. It has also witness the Turkey's declaration of its intent for a military operation in the region east of the Euphrates and its opposition to "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" which it declared a terrorist organization. All of this is also accompanied by the presence of international intervention in the Syrian issue and the dwindling of Syrian forces' influence on the course of events.

The National Consensus Index payed attention in its second edition to the changes that occurred on the political and military level, especially with regard to some of the factional mergers and the appearance of some emerging communities of a political nature.

The National Consensus Index monitors the stances gathered from the Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces towards 12 issues that occurred during the second half of 2018. These can be divided into three main groups, which are:

1. Events related to the political process
2. Events special to domestic issues
3. International events related to the Syrian issue

The report consists of three main parts:

Methodology of the National Consensus Index

This part explains the methodology which the center relied on, beginning from defining the groups monitored and their political stances towards the issues that will be monitored, to the methodology for monitoring and the center's categorizations, and how they are transformed to numbers which can be measured, defining the metric to measure the presence or absence of consensus.

Percentage of Consensus

This part displays the results of the numeric analysis in the form of percentages, this percentage is then transformed into the form of "compatible stances" or "non-compatible stances," which clarifies the percentage of consensus between the Syrian components towards the monitored issues.

Conclusions and Results

This part discusses the previous results with a simple analysis to define the degree of consensus between the Syrian components.

Part One:

The Index's Methodology

The National Consensus Index's methodology relied on three elements: determining the entities, analyzing their stances, and numeric analysis.

First: Determining the Entities

We mean by it the totality of the measures which the working team followed in determining the entities whose stances will be monitored. This can be summarized in the criteria which are as follows:

1- It belongs in general to the Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces

2- It has official positions [1].

3- It practices political activities in one form or another, which express its effectiveness and influence in general in Syria and specifically on the political and military arenas[2].

Building on these criteria, tens of entities were determined to be a site of observation. After applying the criteria of the political effectiveness of each entity, some of the forces and entities were removed (Appendix No.1)[3] .

1 - This criteria represents an essential condition to understand the entity's stances. We would like to point here that monitoring depended on the official statements released by the observed entities through their special official channels, or statements from politicians of the highest degree through social media in their official or party capacity, whereas opinion pieces published on the official websites or other media sites were not considered as they do not necessarily expressed an official entity of the entity they are affiliated to.

2 - Political effectiveness can take many forms, such as issuing political statements, participating in coalitions and political gatherings, etc.

3 - The total number of entities which were monitored reached 40. However, applying the standards mentioned above, the index reduced it to 32 entities which complied with the criteria, with 8 being excluded as shown in the appendix, which had official channels, but were excluded for reasons explained in the appendix.

The stances of the civil organizations and bodies which indirectly participated in the political process while being consulted, considering the lack of a formal representative of these consultations, where the issues they agree upon not being declared formally, in addition to that some of the declared statements represents the opinion of a part of it (such as the Brusells statement), which a number of the participating organizations declared did not represent them. These declared statements are most likely concerned with humanitarian work issues, which falls under the framework of the compatible stances which we excluded as will be explained.

The following is a table of the forces and entities monitored by the Index:

Political Forces

تيار الغد السوري	الإخوان المسلمين	هيئة التفاوض العليا	الائتلاف الوطني لقوى الثورة والمعارضة السورية
أحرار مجموعة العمل من أجل سوريا	SDC إعلان سورية للتغيير الوطني الديمقراطي	هيئة التنسيق الوطنية	المجلس السوري التركماني
تكتل السوريين	حزب الشعب الديمقراطي السوري	مواطنة Citizinship – Citoyenneté	المجلس الوطني الكردي
الحركة السياسية النسوية السورية THE SYRIAN WOMEN'S POLITICAL MOVEMENT MOUVEMENT POLITIQUE FÉMININ SYRIEN	التجمع الجمهوري السوري THE SYRIAN DEMOCRATIC GATHERING	حزب النداء الوطني الديمقراطي	المنظمة الآشورية الديمقراطية
KKS رابطة المستقلين الكرد السوريين Kombenda Kurdên Serbixwe yên Sûriyê Bağımsız Suriye Kürt Rabitesi	حزب اليسار الديمقراطي السوري Democratic Left Party D.L.P	الحزب الوطني للعدالة والدستور - وعد	اتحاد الديمقراطيين السوريين Syrian Democratic Union

Legal Bodies

المجلس الإسلامي السوري SURİYELİ İSLAM KONSEYİ	SYRIAN ISLAMIC COUNCIL

Military Forces

جيش العزة	فيلق الشام	جبهة تحرير سوريا	جيش الإسلام
قوات الشهيد أحمد العبدو	وفد قوى الثورة السورية العسكري The Military Delegation of the Syrian Revolutionary Forces	الجبهة الوطنية للتحرير	هيئة الاركان العامة للجيش السوري الحر

Popular Bodies with Political Activity

الهيئة السياسية في محافظة ادلب	الهيئة السياسية لقوى الثورة في محافظة حلب	الكتلة الوطنية الجامعة في سورية

The Observed Entities were divided into:

• **Observing Forces:** The emerging political forces that have manifested recently, and which are mostly of a local nature[1]. It also includes some military forces which have not participated or entered into the current political process (The negotiations body or the Astana delegation) but issue political stances or statements[2].

• **Participating Forces:** The forces and entities that have a clear structure, and have influence on political decisions, unlike the observing forces mentioned above[3].

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Participating          Entities Targeted          Applying the Criteria
Forces                 by Index

Observing                                          Observing the
Forces                 Excluded Entities           Entities
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**Illustration clarifying process of
choosing the observed forces**

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1 - These entities can be considered as political entities emerging from the people, which follows the political events and comments on them, and we monitored three of these entities: the National Bloc, the Political Authority in Idlib, and the Political Authority for the Revolutionary Forces in the Idlib Governorate.

2 - We monitored three military entities which the previous criteria apply to (not entering the current political track of negotiations, the Astana Summit, and have political statements and stances), which are The General Staff, Jaysh al-Izza, and the Forces of Martyr Ahmed al-Abdo.

3 - 26 entities were monitored, five from the Syrian military factions which have direct participating in the negotiations process: the National Liberation Front, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Rahman, the Syrian Liberation Front, and the Military Revolutionary Forces' Delegation to the Astana Summit).

Second: Methodology of Analyzing Stances

We mean by it all of the rules followed in analyzing the political stances followed by the observed forces. They are as follows:

1 - The absence of a declared stance or statement from the observed entity is considered "silence," which is completely different from the state of a clear statement or declaration of neutrality.

2- The Index's numeric determining of the declared stances:[1].

5	Declared Support or the like	4	Implicit Support or the like
	3	Declared Neutrality[2]	
1	Declared rejection or the like	2	Implicit Rejection or the like
	0	Silence[3]	

3- The percentage of declared stances of the entities in the above categories (silence, implicit support, declared support, etc.) does not mean there is a general rule applied on all, as sometimes the nature of the event or stance nature is clear making its categorization easy, and sometimes is obscure making it require analysis to be attributed to any of six determined stances in the Index.

Therefore, in order to achieve this, we decided to point in the footnotes to the working team's understanding of the implicit or obscure stances to clarify the process for the reader.

1- Look at footnote number8 of this report.

2- Neutrality is a positive stance of declaring a statement in which the entity determines its neutrality towards a political event, as for silence it is a negative stance, which includes any stances towards the event or the political reality.

3- We could consider all of the stances of silence that the entities and bodies adopts as being within two categories:
• Superficial Silence: meaning that the entity is either used to releasing its stances through higher-up officials through their statements, tweets or media interviews, which we have excluded from monitoring from several reasons some of which we have already explained, or that those entities carry out other actions that demonstrate a certain stance towards the situation without declaring that stance, or it has a tacit stance it does not want to declare for many reasons, etc.
Conclusion: The entity could have a stance but for different reasons does not directly declare it. Despite this not being true silence, we treated this as such since the entity's stance is not clear so we do not have to analyze the possibility of error in attributing a certain position to an entity, which would not be appropriate for an index which must be built on clear and factual stances and not uncertain information.
• True Silence: the entity's not paying interest to the issue or the absence of any stance.

4- In the case that the observed entity was part of a coalition, the coalition's position is attributed to it in the case that it did not itself issue its own statement, according to the following details:

• The National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces' position is attributed to the Kurdish National Council, the Syrian Turkmen Assembly, and the Assyrian Democratic Organizations, seeing as how they are parts of it

• The Syrian Negotiations Body's position is considered to be the same as the National Coordination Committee so long as it did not release its own statement

• Every one of (Appeal party, Syrian Democrats Union, Democratic Left Party, Free Syrian Kurdish Union, Citizenship Movement, People's Democratic Party "Interim Leadership," and the National Party for Justice and the Constitution- Waed) are parts of the Syrian Democratic Gathering, and the gathering's position is attributed to them so long as they did not release their own statement.

• Both Jaysh al-Islam and the Forces of Martyr Ahmed al-Abdo are part of the national army, and the position of the General Staff is attributed to them[1].

• The positions of the National Liberation Front are attributed to both the Syrian Liberation Front and the Sham Legion.

5- In the case that the observed entity is a part of more than one coalition, the position of the last coalition it entered is attributed to it[2].

6- The index did not stress the position of the military and political entities; considering the complexity and interwoveness of those bodies and their multiple affiliations. However, the methodology relied on in choosing the monitored entities indirectly stressed the positions of the coalitions, as their positions were attributed to the entities affiliated with them targeted by the index[3].

Third: Measuring Consensus

After observing and classifying the stances, the result was transformed to "compatible" or "non-compatible" positions.

By Compatible Positions, we mean those declared stances which are in accordance with the majority, whether implicitly or explicitly, positively or negatively, whereas the Non-Compatible Positions are those differing from the majority. The "silent" positions of the entities do enter into the percentages, this is due partially due to the fact that the "silent" positions are many. In addition, entering them into the percentage would lead to a confusion with the declared stances. However, in the footnotes, we will place the silent positions to alert the reader to the difference between the two[4].

1- The position of the General Staff was attributed to Jaysh al-Islam as it is the most recent entity it has affiliated with. However, we would like to point out that the rest of the factions affialted with the General Staff have been excluded, as they did not record any political position during the second half of the year and did not participate in the staff's political statements, and its leadership did not issue through its official representatives any comment on a political events, but only news of the military situation on the ground.

2- The stances of the negotiating committee were attributed to the coordination body, which is considered a part of two coalitions (the Syrian Democratic Gathering and the High Negotiations Committee), as it is the more recent of the two.

3- For example, The Syrian Democratic Gathering had seven contributions, seeing as how its position is attributed to the seven groups affiliated under it, all of which are monitored in the index, such as is the case with the High Negotiations Committee, and the National Liberation Front, whose stances become more important given the entities affiliated with them that are monitored by the index.

4- the difference between calculating the position of "silence" and not calculating it, is that in the former consideration is only given to declared positions. Furthermore, if a position of silence is the majority, it does not enter into the calculation of compatible positions, unlike the case in the latter.

For clarification: Related to the forces' positions towards the international events related to the Syrian issue, the percentage of consensus among the declared stances, which are 27.01%, is 22.99%, if we did not include the positions of silence. However, if we do include them to the declared stances and considered them like the rest of the positions, the percentage of consensus is 72.99%.

Part Two

-9-

Percentage of Consensus between the Syrian Forces

After we have gotten to know the index's methodology, we will now clarify the percentages and the compatible positions according to the methodology.

In order to make it easier to read the index, we will categorize the 12 monitored[1] events into three main titles:

1- Stances Related to the Political Process :
• Developments in the Constitutional Committee
• The Russian Roadmap for Return of Refugees

2- Stances Related to Internal Events
• Daesh's attack on the Suweida desert (July 2018)
• The evacuation of the residents of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya
• The Violations commited by the coalition in region of Deir ezZor[2]
• The Regime and its Allies' accusation of the opposition forces of bombing East Aleppo with chemical weapons (November 2018)
• Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive against the National Liberation Front (December 2018).

3- International Events Related to the Syrian Issue
• The Statements of the United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura on Idlib (August 2018)[3].
• The Russian-Turkish agreement on Idlib (Sochi Agreement, September 2018)[4].
• The planned Turkish military operation east of the Euphrates
• International Normalization with the Assad regime
• The American declaration of its withdrawal from North Syria (December 2018)[5].

1- 17 events through the second half of the year 2018 were monitored. We, however, excluded some clear stances considering they are areas of previous consensus before the revolutionary and opposition forces (towards the regime's declaration of thousands of names who? During torture, towards the siege of the Rukban camp, the regime's violations towards regions included under the Sochi agreement, assassination of revolutionary activists in liberated areas, executions in the Hama prison) as including these in the index would lead to an exaggeration in the percentage of consensus and distort the real consensus on issues that lead to differences in opinion.
2- This stance was monitored even though it of the stances which are predominated by consensus, in order to test the saying that "the revolutionary and opposition forces do not take interest in the Eastern region and what happens in it."
3- The UN envoy expressed that it was the Assad regime's right to regain Syrian territorial unity, pointing to "Idlib has in it a high concentration of foreign fighters, and has the highest number of an-Nusra and al-Qaeda fighters, in addition to their families." This is a clear support to excuse Russia and the Assad regime's launching a military operation against Idlib, as he also expressed that "both the Assad regime and Jabhat an-Nusra have the ability to use chemical weapons," and "there is no excuse for using heavy weaponry" in Idlib.
De Misturo expressed on his readiness to go to Idlib to ensure a humanitarian passage for civilians to quickly exit the governorate and that the civilians in Idlib "do not have another Idlib to flee to" https://bit.ly/2PP48BY
4- What are the articles of the agreement to establish a weapon-free zone in Idlib, BBC Arabic https://bbc.in/2QzYg01
5- Trump formally declares the withdrawal of his troops from Syria, Andalou Agency https://bit.ly/2SSFvJ4.

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First: Percentage of Consensus towards Events Related to the Political Process

It includes the development on the formation of the Constitutional Committee and their stances towards it[1], and the Russian roadmap for the return of refugees[2].

An analysis of the stances of the observed entities comes to the following percentages:

### Stances related to the Political Process - Participating Entities

Russian roadmap for return of refugees: Silent 84.6%, Opposed 3.8%, Moderately Opposed 11%

Constitutional Committee: Silent 30.8%, Opposed 7.7%, Moderately Opposed 30.8%, Support 30.8%

Legend: Support | Moderately Support | Neutral | Moderately Opposed | Opposed | Silent

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
1- Clarification of stances towards the Constitutional Committee:
    1-Explicit refusal: refusal of the committee or withdrawing from it
    2-Implicit refusal: criticizing the committee or considering it as representing a departure from the resolutions of the Security Council, or that it will not lead promised political transition.
    3-Implicit approval: approving of the committee without participating in it
    4-Explicit approval: participating in the committee
2- Clarification of stances towards the Russian roadmap for the return of refugees
    1-Explicit Refusal: clear refusal of the Russian efforts to return Syrian refugees, and warning them to not return until after the application of the Security Council's resolutions.
    2-Implicit Refusal: pointing out that the return of refugees must be accompanied by security guarantees, and warning them to not return until after the application of the Security Council's resolutions.
    3-Explicit Approval: clear support of the Russian roadmap

Stances Related to the Political Process - Observing Forces

Chart legend: Support | Moderately Support | Neutral | Moderately Opposed | Opposed | Silent

Russian roadmap for return of refugees: 100%

Constitutional Committee: 83%, 17%

The degrees of consensus or opposition towards these issues, are as such[1]:

Index of Consensus related to Political Process - Participating **Forces**

	Consensus of positions on the constitutional process	Russian roadmap for return of refugees	Constitutional Committee
Silence	57.7%	84.6%	30.8%
Disagreement	15.4%		30.8%
Consensus	26.9%	15.4%	38.4%

Index of Consensus related to the Political Process- Observing **Forces**

	Russian roadmap for return of refugees	Constitutional Committee
Silence	100%	83%
Consensus		17%

Legend: ▢ Silence   ▢ Disagreement   ▢ Consensus

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1- As for the monitored entities, we did not provide an illustration to clarify the totality of consensus in every group, because in this case the percentages of consensus would get mixed up and would be attributed to events which no entity commented on. For example, on the stances towards the political process, these entities released statements at 17%, whereas the percentage of silence reached 100% with regards to the Russian roadmap for the return of refugees. Furthermore, if we extrapolated the arithmetic mean of the two, the percentage of consensus with regards to the political process would be 8.5%, and this percentage would be attributed to the Russian roadmap, though there is no statement on it.

Second: Percentage of Consensus towards Internal Events:

This groups includes the following events[1]: Daesh's attack on the Suweida desert, the evacuation of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya, the violations committed by the alliance's planes in the Deir ez-Zor region, the regime and its allies' accusation of the opposition forces of bombing Aleppo with chemichal weapons, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive against the National Liberation Front[2].

Stances related to Internal Affairs - Participating Forces

Legend: Support | Moderately Support | Neutral | Moderately Opposed | Opposed | Silent

Event	Opposed	Silent
HTS offensive against National Liberation Force	46%	54%
Regime and its allies accusation of the opposition of bombing with chemical weapons	12%	88%
violations caused by the alliance in Deir ez-Zor	19%	81%
Evacuation of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya	4%	96%
Daesh offensive against Suweida desert	69%	31%

1- The monitored stances towards these events did not include any implicit stances in need of further clarification. Rather, they varied between explicit refusal and silence.

2- The index considered:

    1-An aggressive refusal of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and calling for them to be fought

    2-an implicit refusal to be a denunciation of this offensive

Considering that this research was done in the last days of 2018, the forces stances towards this offensive, which appeared in the beginning of 2019, was taken into consideration in the current issue.

As for the stances of the participating entities towards these events:

Stances Related to Internal Affairs - Observing Forces

Chart showing stances by observing forces across five events:

Event	Opposed	Silent
HTS offensive against National Liberation Force	33%	67%
egime and its allies accusation of the opposition of bombing with chemical weapons		100%
violations caused by the alliance in Deir ez-Zor		100%
Evacuation of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya		100%
Daesh offensive against Suweida desert		100%

Legend: Support · Moderately Support · Neutral · Moderately Opposed · Opposed · Silent

As follows is the percentage of consensus or opposition towards these issues:

Consensus Index related to Internal Events - Participating Forces

	Silence	Consensus
Total consensus of positions on international events	70%	30%
HTS offensive against National Liberation Force	70%	30%
Regime and its allies accusation of the opposition of bombing with chemical weapons	88%	12%
violations caused by the alliance in Deir ez-Zor	81%	19%
Evacuation of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya	96%	4%
Daesh offensive against Suweida desert	31%	69%

Consensus Index Related to Internal Events - Observing Forces

|	Silence	Consensus
HTS offensive against National Liberation Force	67%	33%
Regime and its allies accusation of the opposition of bombing with chemical weapons	100%	
violations caused by the alliance in Deir ez-Zor	100%	
Evacuation of al-Fu'ah and Kafriya	100%	
Daesh offensive against Suweida desert	100%	

Silence   Disagreement   Consensus

Third: Percentage of Consensus towards International Events related to the Syrian Issue

This group includes the statements by Staffan de Mistura on escalation in Idlib, The Turkish-Russian "Sochi" agreement, the Turkish declaration of a future military campaign east of the Euphrates[1] ,international normalization with the Assad regime[2] , and American withdrawal from North Syria[3].

Stances of International Events related to the Syrian Issue- Participating Forces

1- The stances towards the planned Turkish operation are represented by:
• Explicit refusal: denunciation of the operation and refusing it
• Implicit refusal: calling for finding a solution by which the region would avoid a military operation or make an initiative in this regard.
• Implicit approval: calling Turkey to fill the gap in this vital region, or pointing to the need to be rid of terrorist organizations, and empower the people of the region to manage their region.
• Explicit approval: approval of the operation or declaring their readiness to participate in it
2- Clarification of stances towards the process of international normalization with the Assad regime:
• Explicit refusal: a clear refutation and considering it a clear mistake which will serve the Assad regime and Iran's interest.
• Implicit refusal: calling for the Arab nations to not pass over the suffering of the Syrian people and not take policies that will extend the regime's life, and to support a political solution
3- Stances towards the American withdrawal from North Syria are as follows:
• Explicit Refusal: refusing the withdrawal and denouncing it
• Implicit Refusal: calling for the withdrawal to be slown down until Kurdish interests are guaranteed
• Implicit approval: supporting the withdrawal and demanding for the region to not be left under the control of the Kurds, Assad forces or Iranian militias
• Explicit approval: confirming the unity of Syrian territory and refusing the presence of foreign forces
Considering that this research was conducted in the last days of 2018, the forces stances towards this event, which appeared in the beginning of 2019, was included within the current issue

Stances of International Events related to the Syrian Issue- Observing Forces

	American withdrawal	normalization with Assad regime	military operation east of Euphrates	Russian-Turkish Sochi agreement	De Misturo's statements on Idlib
Silent	100%	67%	67%	83%	67%
Opposed		33%			33%
Support			33%		
Moderately Opposed				17%	

Legend: Support — Moderately Support — Neutral — Moderately Opposed — Opposed — Silent

And as follows is the percentage of consensus or non-consensus towards these issues:

Consensus Index on International Events related to the Syrian Issue- Participating Forces

Category	Silence	Disagreement	Consensus
Total consensus of positions on international events	55.4%	3.8%	40.8%
American withdrawal	77%	3.8%	19%
normalization with Assad regime	54%		46%
military operation east of Euphrates	46.2%	15.4%	38.5%
Russian-Turkish Sochi agreement	54%		46%
De Misturo's statements on Idlib	46%		54%

Consensus Index on International Events related to the Syrian Issue- Observing Forces

Category	Silence	Consensus
American withdrawal	100%	
normalization with Assad regime	67%	33%
military operation east of Euphrates	67%	33%
Russian-Turkish Sochi agreement	83%	17%
De Misturo's statements on Idlib	67%	33%

Silence   Disagreement   Consensus

Part Three: Conclusions and Results[1]

With the aim of reading the above numbers which the index reached, we will speak now on the percentages of consensus, then on the phenomenon of silence amongst the revolutionary and opposition forces. We will then move after that to an analytical reading of the declared stances and compare the development of stances since the previous issue which covered the first half of 2018. And will take two examples: the Constitutional Committee and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive against the National Liberation Front. We will then conclude the index with some recommendations.

First: the Phenomenon of Silence among the Revolutionary and Opposition Forces[2]

1- The Participating Forces: The highest percentage of silence for these forces was towards the evacuation of al-Fua'h and Kafriya at 96%, then the accusation against the opposition of bombing Aleppo with chemical weapons at 88%, then the Russian roadmap for the return of refugees at 85%.

2- Of the three groups, the highest average, was in the group of internal events at 70%[3] , then the group of events related to the political process at 58%. The average of silence in the stances of the participating forces was at 62% towards the monitored events.

3- The Observing Forces: The highest percentage of silence was towards the internal events, which are five events, and for four of them the percentage of silence was 100%, in addition to the the Russian roadmap for the return of refugees and the American withdrawal from the east of Euphrates.
The highest median percentage of silence of the three groups was in the groups of internal events at 93.4 %, then the group of events related to the political process at 91.5%.
The average of silence in the stances of the observing forces was 86% towards the monitored events.

4- The following table explains the percentage of silence related to the events and groups and the total average:

	Highest Percentage of Silence	Highest Average of Silence in the Groups of Events	Average of Silence
Participating	Al-Fua'h and Kafirya (internal)	Internal Events	%62
	Accusation of Opposition of using Chemical (internal)	Political Process	
Observing	Five Internal Events with exception of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive	Internal Events	%86
	American Withdrawal from East of Euphrates (international)	Political Process	

1 In the conclusions and results, by
  • Public declaration: we mean the forces' declaration of their stances regardless of their nature as being neutral, in support or in refusal.
  • Silence: We mean the lack of declaring any stance
2 We would like to confirm once more that monitoring an entity of the Syrian revolutionary and opposition forces as having a position of silence doesn't at all mean evaluating it negatively, and the declaring of a stance as positive, because the index's task is to determine the percentages of consensus, without displaying the content of the position itself.
3 In the previous issue, silence towards internal events held the highest position, as is the case in this issue, even the difference between the two was 29%, as 95% of stances were silent in the first issue, and 70% in this issue.

Second: Percentages for Declared Stances:

1- Participating Forces: The highest percentage of stating their positions towards a specific event was towards the events of the Constitutional Committee and Daesh's attack on the Suweida desert at 69%, and then stances towards the planned Turkish operation east of the Euphrates at 54%.

The highest average of stating positions among the three groups was with regards to the group of international events related to Syria, which reached 55.4%.

The average of stating positions was 38%.

2- Observing Forces: The highest percentage of stating positions was at 34% for the following events: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive against the National Liberation Front, De Misturo's statements on Idlib, the planned Turkish operation, and international normalization with the Assad regime.

As for the highest percentage of stating positions it was in the groups of international events related to Syria at approximately 23%.

The average of stating positions was 14%.

3- The following table explains the percentages of the declared stances towards the specific event, the groups and the general average:

	Highest percentage of statement	Highest average of statement in the groups of events	Average of statement
Participating	The Constitutional Committee (political process)	International Events related to Syria	%38
	Daesh's attack on the Suweida desert (internal)		
Observing	International events (three of five): De Misturo's statements with regard to Idlib, the planned Turkish operation east of the Euphrates, international normalization with Assad regime, in addition to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive (internal)	International Events related to Syria	%14
	American withdrawal from east of Euphrates (international)		

Third: Index of Political Statements

The Political Statements Index is a numeric index and not an evaluation; it monitors the percentage of statement and silence, with the goal of introducing the reader to the entities which release statements the most or the least, without the mentioned percentages being a sign indicating political effectiveness.

The table below clarifies the stances of every entity, and without calculating the stances of coalitions if they did not participate on its website, whereas the second displays the entities who release statements on the monitored events from least to most.

Name	Index of Political Statements	Name	Index of Political Statements
People's Democratic Party	17%	High Negotiations Committee	83%
Union of Syrian Democrats	17%	National Coalition for the Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces	75%
Ahrar- Working for Syria	17%	The Military Revolutionary Forces' Delegation to the Astana Conference	50%
Feminist Movement	17%	Syria's Tomorrow Movement	42%
The Political Authority in Idlib	17%	Muslim Brotherhood	42%
General Staff	17%	Kurdish National Assembly	33%
Jaysh al-Islam	17%	National Liberation Front	33%
Forces of Martyr Ahmed al-Abdo	17%	The Sham Legion	33%
Citizenship Movement	8%	Syrian Liberation Front	33%
National Party for Justice and the Constitution-Waed	8%	Assyrian Democratic Organization	25%
Free Syrian Kurdish Union	8%	National Coordination Committee	25%
Syrian Bloc	8%	Democratic Left Party	25%
National Bloc	8%	Syrian Islamic Council	25%
Political Authority for the Revolutionary Forces in Idlib	8%	Syrian Turkmen Assembly	17%
Jaysh al-Izza	8%	The Syrian Declaration of Democratic Change	17%
Appeal Party 1	0%	Syrian Democratic Gathering	17%

It is clear from the previous table that the vast majority of the forces monitored by the index dealt with the political events with "no statement (silence)."
We would like to confirm again that the Political Statements Index is to measure the extent of statements with regards to the events and not evaluation. "Silence" is sometimes the best and safest position after evaluation and analysis.

1- The Appeal Party was monitored given that the criteria for selection of monitored entities applied to it, and because it had statements and stances on the 17 events monitored, with the exception of five that had full consensus (that is, all the events it commented were among the events that full consensus).

Four: Percentage of Consensus in the Stances of the Revolutionary and Opposition Forces

1- The percentage of declared stances (compatible and non-compatible) reached 38% for the monitored events, and the degree of consensus reached 89%, whereas the non-compatible positions reached 11%[1].

Index of Total Consensus- Participating Forces

- uyumluluk
- uyumsuzluk
- sessizlik

2- As for the Observing Forces, the percentage of declaring stances reached to 14% of the events, whereas the consensus in declared stances was 100%, with a single opposing stance.

- uyumluluk
- uyumsuzluk
- sessizlik

3- As for the Participating Forces:

- The highest degree of consensus was in two events: Daesh's attack on the Suweida desert at 69%, and De Misturo's comments on Idlib at 54%..

- The events which caused the most diversity in opinions (consensus-opposition) were:

Situation	Percentage of Consensus (majority)	Percentage of Opposition (minority)
Constitutional Committee	%38.4	%30.8
Operation east of Euphrates	%38.5	%15.4

1 This percentage is from the 38% which makes up the total declared stances

Five: Development of stances through the last half of 2018 (Constitutional Committee and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive as examples)

The following table explains the stances towards the Constitutional Committee:

	Silence	Con-sensus	Oppo-sition	Number of monitored entities	Reason for difference in percentages if found	Observations
First Issue First half of 2018	38%	52%	10%	30	The addition of the Syrian Democratic Gathering and its percentage of consensus being attributed to the six forces affiliated under it, and they implicitly refuse the committee.	The consensus turned from supporting the committee to refusing it even if at a smaller percentage
Second Issue Second half of 2018	30.8%	38.4%	30.8%	26		

The following table explains the stances towards Hayat Tahrir al-Sham's offensive against the National Liberation Front:

|	Silen-ce	Neut-rality	Con-sensus	Oppo-sition	Number of monitored events	Reason for difference in percentages if found	Observations
First Issue First half of 2018	90%	3%	7%	---	30	The statement of the political forces, at their head the coalition, High Negotiations Committee, the Islamic Council, General staff and some of the military factions	In the first issue the conflict was between the Syrian Liberation Front and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, whereas in the second issue it was between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the National Liberation Front
Second Issue Second half of 2018	54%	----	46%	---	26		

Appendix

The entities which were monitored in the first issue but were excluded from monitoring this issue due to not meeting the selection criteria

Title	Observations
Syrian National Movement	No released political statement during the period at hand
Republican Party	No political statement expressing its political opinion on the general events during the period of observation, with the exception of statement clarifying the basis of its alliance with the National Democratic Meeting in Syria
Movement of National Action for Syria	The official representative has long been unemployed
Faylaq al-Rahman	No released political statement during the period at hand
Ahrar al-Sharqiyya	No released political statement during the period at hand
Sultan Murad Division	No released political statement during the period at hand
Firqat al-Mu'tasim	No released political statement during the period at hand
Hamza Division	No released political statement during the period at hand

DIALOGUE

BUILDS

BRIDGES

مؤشر التوافق الـوطـنـي

الحوار

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