The 2024 US Presidential Elections: Controversy Without End

Despite widespread speculation about a changing global order[1] and possibly diminishing US power, millions of Arabs are still riveted by American electoral contests. The 2024 presidential election less than ten days away holds Syrians and Arabs/Muslims in suspense. The ongoing wars in Gaza and now Lebanon have become significant issues in the race. Neither participants in the election nor its observers should hope too seriously that votes for either candidate will spell American-led advancements for freedom, dignity, or peace in Syria or the broader Middle East. US core interests will remain unchanged even if it is not precisely clear what either a Harris (Democratic) or Trump (Republican) presidency might mean for Syria in particular. But one thing is for sure. The upcoming election has proved fiercely contentious among both Arab/Muslim voters in the US and interested Arab observers. Interpreting the debate on the upcoming election necessitates taking a hard look at American foreign policy in the Middle East from Syria to Palestine and beyond, as this author argues below. The big picture and the background matter, as this analysis report seeks to demonstrate.

Research and abundant empirical observation point to core US foreign policy interests[2] in the Middle East: access to hydrocarbons (energy); support for “Israel” and other allies; and counterterrorism and other related security objectives. Administrations come and go as the two parties alternate power. The precise scope and direction of security threats also fluctuates over time. But these central American interests have retained their relative stability for decades.

This recognition is not the same, however, as expecting that the precise status quo of leaders, alliances, conflicts, and popular positions will prevail in the region. In attempting to meet core US interests, presidents (and their advisors) pursue different pathways and chart policies informed by their own backgrounds, ideologies, readings of developments, and other factors. Occasionally and rather slowly, changes in US strategy do take place to achieve core interests. Events of the past year only confirm the region’s volatility. Most of us expect that major changes and geopolitical shifts are in the works. The (dis)regard for territorial boundaries; “Israeli” expansionism and annexation; the leadership and makeup of non-state actors including Hamas and Hizbullah; the degrees of violent escalation and confrontation between Iran and Israel, or Iran and the US; Turkey’s impending normalization with the Syrian regime; possibly looming battles in Northwest Syria; and unending, emotionally charged disagreements at the popular level, are just some examples.  All indications are that the Middle East—the alliances that comprise it, the relations between states and international powers (the US, Russia)—are in fast-unfolding disarray. This set of upheavals is the most dramatic we have witnessed since the 2011 revolutions and counterrevolutions, and before that the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Maybe for this reason, the 2024 elections feel like such a high-stakes game.

Policy Continuity

In this extremely explosive environment whose painful death toll and destruction mounts to American indifference, what can we expect from the still uncertain outcome of the impending US election? For Syria watchers, this question is significant on at least two levels. First, the election outcome likely spurs apprehension among countless other Syrians, Arabs, and Muslims for whom US foreign policy is always a pressing concern. Second, the election direct relevance to Syrian holders of American citizenship, whether immigrants or first-generation Syrian Americans. How they should vote (if at all) and what can they reasonably anticipate whether Trump or Harris win.

Let us first address the likely implications of the US elections for the first audience. There is not much reason to believe that US policy towards the Middle East under either Trump or Harris would change significantly from its current trajectory. For the record, neither the Republican[3] nor the Democratic party[4] specifically mentions Syria in their 2024 election platform. This is despite the flurry of US attacks on declared ISIS or Iran-related targets in Syria over the past year, in tandem with Israel’s US-backed war in Gaza and Lebanon. Based on their respective platforms, both parties position themselves as hawkish on Iran. (The Obama-Trump contrast on Iran may have diminished in the Harris-Trump contest.) The position on Iran is of course relevant to the region and specifically the Syrian war where Iranian militias stand out among the violent cacophony of foreign invaders, alongside Russia helping to keep Assad in power. The two parties competitively brandish their commitment to Israel’s “security” and “self-defense” in its wars. During his presidency (2017-2021) Trump had appeared more aggressive in his stance against Iran (by leaving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action known as the nuclear deal,[5] for example). Yet the Democrats are castigating Trump for his “fecklessness and weakness” against Iran. The chronology of Biden’s escalation against Iran and its “terrorist proxies” over the past several months is prominent in the Democratic platform.

Whichever of the two candidates wins, then, we are likely to witness more of the same when it comes to pursuing the core interests of US foreign policy in the Middle East. Domestically, however, indications are strong that Trump will be harsher on (Arab and Muslim, including Syrian) Americans and immigrants. His party alarmingly if predictably pledges to “carry out the largest deportation operation in American history” and stop the “migrant invasion”, going so far as to strip “Foreign Nationals who support terrorism and jihadism” of their visas to the US. The Democrats, on the other hand, promise to combat Islamophobia alongside antisemitism–although Arab Americans would be right to question the Democratic record given events of the past year. The stabbing of a 6-year-old Palestinian American boy in Chicago and other hate crimes, combined with police crackdowns on Palestine campus protests, suggest that as in Europe, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim racism appear to have spiked in the wake of the current war in the US today. Trump’s return may exacerbate through new policy an already challenging environment for non-white America and its aspiring immigrants.

Arab and Muslim Voters

What about Arabs and Muslims in the US? This election season, Gaza tops Arab and Muslim voter concerns. The Arab-American/Muslim demographic that includes Syrians is not in agreement about everything pertaining to the US role in the Middle East. According to polling, civil society statements, and media interventions, however, for most of these voters the Biden administration’s prominent role in the genocide is (nearly) unforgivable. A resultant debate has ensued regarding the American two-party system’s limitations and alternatives. The third-party Green Party candidate Jill Stein, whose running mate Butch Ware is a Muslim convert, proposes a radically different agenda. According to its platform, the Green Party’s “foreign policy and demilitarization”[6] position rails against the US “war machine.” The declared aim is ending US imperialism, including recalling American troops in Iraq and Syria. This issue is relevant given that officially, around 900-1000 US troops (plus other contractors) are currently stationed in Syria, to support the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces and combat ISIS. Stein also proposes an arms embargo on Israel, insists on a ceasefire and end to the blockade in Gaza, and proposes overall reductions in US “interventionism” around the globe. Some aspects of the Green Party’s foreign policy platform dovetail with those of academic-activist Cornel West, running as an Independent. Stein appears to have recently changed her position on Syria. The physician-presidential candidate has described herself “anti-interventionist” but not pro-Assad.[7] Was this a move geared at attracting more of the anti-Israel and Arab/Muslim vote?

Why the attention to Stein, when she, like West, will not win the race? An opinion poll[8] of Muslim voters conducted in late August by the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) shows Stein roughly tied to Kamala Harris at around 29%. Slightly over 11% will vote for Trump, 4% for West. But what may be most telling is that over 16% of those polled are still undecided. Clearly, outrage over Gaza has not left Trump without supporters. In fact, 81% of Arab American voters surveyed recently[9] point to Gaza as a decisive issue. Among this constituency, Trump and Harris are nearly tied, with a slight lead for the Republican candidate at 42% vs. 41% support respectively.

Thus, one important debate these days among Muslim and Arab voters runs something like: is a vote for Stein a wasted or misfired vote? This takes us to the probable calculations of actual voters among the Syrian and Arab populations in the US. Among Arab and Muslim Americans broadly, the debate rages about who to vote for. Civic groups, including the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council, are encouraging Muslim voters to head to the voting booth, rather than boycotting the elections altogether. Should voters punish Biden’s genocidal abetment in Gaza by not voting for Harris? Should they vote for Jill Stein? How harmful for Arab Americans or Muslims will a vote for Trump be? Is a vote for Jill Stein an indirect vote for Donald Trump, since it takes votes away from Harris–in which case Arab or Muslim voters will be participants in a crackdown likely to come if Trump ascends once again to the Oval Office?

These are relevant queries imbued with both rationalist calculations and urgent moral considerations. A few American Muslim media personalities and politicians implicitly or explicitly advocate voting for Harris. The Uncommitted Movement, a ‘protest bloc’ within the Democratic Party organized since the primary elections earlier this year, has decided not to endorse Harris. They have not clearly spelled out an alternative presidential candidate, however. This novel movement still asks Democratic-leaning voters to cast their ballot at least for local and state level officials. More telling is the first-time decision of the Arab American Political Action Committee[10] to back neither Trump nor Harris because of both candidates’ “blind support” to Israel. At the same time, Emgage, a large Muslim voter organization,[11] has endorsed Kamala Harris out of a sense of duty to help “defeat Donald Trump,” as its statement put it.

Policy Assessments and Predictions

Clearly there is no single position on the civically responsible and morally palatable position to take. Even the politically pragmatic choice is not clearcut. This seems to be an unresolved controversy among Arab and Muslim voters in the US. (Even among advocates of Palestine and Arab/Muslim causes, social media exchanges have become quite heated.) The US is notorious for its bizarrely antiquated Electoral College system, which carves up the popular vote for the presidency by state. A presidential candidate must attain a majority of the Electoral College vote, determined by the popular votes for president in that state. In other words, a presidential candidate needs 270 of the 538 Electoral College votes. And in all states except Maine and Nebraska,[12] the Electoral College vote is “winner take all.” This electoral arrangement means that despite their relatively small numbers, Arab American and Muslim populations may make a difference in “swing” or “battleground” states with close races. For this reason, many eyes are on Michigan (with its large Arab population),[13] and a few other states including Wisconsin and Arizona.

Ultimately the choice of candidate is an individual one, made by each potential voter who takes it upon him or herself to cast a ballot in this presidential election. From a normative standpoint, both Trump (with his Muslim ban[14] and Abraham Accords record[15]) and Biden (with his “genocide Joe”[16] performance) have been tried and tested by Arabs and Muslims. With regard to Syria, the main issue for many in pro-revolution political and civil society is who will be toughest on Assad. Trump’s strikes against Syria after the Khan Sheikhoun and Douma chemical weapons massacres were applauded at the time by some Syrians. Unlike Obama who drew the infamously disappearing “red line,” despite his flip-flopping on US troops in Syria Trump seemed to take concrete military actions against Assad.[17]

But even for supporters of Trump’s Syria policies, it is important to point out that the US military intervention he ordered did not dislodge Assad. Many Arab regimes have normalized with the Syrian president since. Neither did the strike that killed ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in Northwest Syria help Syrians remove Assad. In fact, the US with its support of the SDF, has been an active architect of the continual fracturing of Syria that is not just politically but also territorially divided. In line with is counterterrorism (more than anti-Assad) military approach, for years the US has carried out strikes in Syria for the “enduring defeat of ISIS”[18] (as Central Command calls it), and against Iran-affiliated targets. Pro-revolution Syrians have admirably sought self-determination, popular sovereignty, dignity, and freedom from dictatorship. That Syria is occupied by several states and a theatre to a range of (often sectarian) militias has long been a troubling development. Anti-Assad Syrians routinely engage in cost-benefit analysis about which foreign power’s military presence and interventions are better or worse for the country’s future. That is of course a sad irony.

This author would like to suggest that Syrian inside and outside the US should have learned a great deal over the past 13 or more years of US involvement in Syria. That the 2011 revolution spiralled into an internationalized war with so much direct foreign military intervention, not just Russian, Iranian, Hizbullah, but American and Turkish, is a devastating paradox. It is easy to (rightly) refuse pro-Assad intervention. But nobody should have any illusions about America’s designs on Syria, either. Palestine and Iraq are sobering examples.

Some members of the Syrian American ‘lobby’ are optimistic that the extension of the Caesar Act[19] and in the best-case scenario, the anti-normalization with Assad bill,[20] makes it through the next Congress to land on the new President’s desk. But such legislation will not end US militarism predominantly directed at the Arab and Muslim world. Nor will anti-Assad legislation supersede unequivocal American backing of Israel. From the author’s perspective, one myth should have been shattered over the past year. Policies permissive or supportive of Israel cannot be ignored, and they cannot be good for Syria or Syrians. Descriptive or prescriptive analysis delinking US policy vis-a-vis Israel from its Syria interventions is simply a fallacy. US Central Command certainly does not neatly divide its “area of responsibility”[21] in the Middle East. Voters should keep this in mind whether or not they make it to the polls on November 5.

The Day After November 5

So, whom should Syrians or Arabs or Muslims hope wins? A strong dosage of painful, violence-inflicted reality tells us that neither Democrat or Republican will bring peoples of the Arab world any closer to just peace, an end to occupation, or a downfall of authoritarianism, let alone popular rule or democracy. It is hard to tell whether or not the time has actually come for Assad to “step aside” on the American (or perhaps American-Russian) clock. Perhaps some Syrian activists hope for short-term advances, facilitated by the US, in ongoing resistance to Assad and his allies. Even here, Syrians are not unified in whether they consider a Trump or Harris presidency to be more promising. In this author’s view, the ideological, economic, political, and military rootedness of US power in the world and the region tell us that emancipation for Syria or any Arab peoples will not come from the US, under any President. Will it matter so much for our region, then, who wins?

However, if US voters wish to demonstrate the angry force of a ‘protest vote’ against the Biden administration’s role in Gaza, they could vote for Stein or make creative use of the write-in option. By refusing to vote for Harris or Trump, they might at least be flexing a fledgling negative Arab/Muslim political force on the US domestic scene. Or they can sit out the vote altogether.

For the foreseeable future, however, more than any other force or political vision, American might—not diplomacy— rules in the Middle East. And that might is wielded to shield Arab dictators in service of US, Israeli, and now Arab normalizers’ interests. The war in Gaza churns on. Syria will likely remain an open battlefront, at least some of its many interlocking conflicts unresolved. As ever, it is vital not to overlook the long arc of US involvement in the region. The 2024 elections and their aftermath will not resolve political disagreements among Arabs and Muslims, inside or outside the US. But whatever its exact strategy for the region will be, the coming US administration will continue to rule a decidedly imperialist power. Voters and observers beware.

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