Executive Summary:

This policy paper addresses the question of rebuilding state institutions in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime, offering a practical roadmap for institutional reform in a complex transitional context.

The paper starts from the premise that peacebuilding and the completion of a free and participatory political transition cannot succeed without effective, legitimate government institutions capable of delivering services and enforcing the rule of law. Comparative experiences show that fragile states often relapse into conflict due to weak institutional governance and the inability of institutions to support security, stability, and the transition to a new political order.

The paper presents an analysis of the current state of Syrian institutions, drawing on international indicators of state fragility. It demonstrates how the former Assad regime built hollow, inefficient institutions that lacked both competence and accountability. It further stresses that maintaining these institutions in their current form and operational structure after political change—without deep reform—will inevitably reproduce authoritarianism in new forms.

The paper adopts the “Institution-Building Before Liberation” (IBL) approach, emphasizing the need to begin with public administration reform, the establishment of an independent judiciary, and professional security institutions, prior to launching a constitutional process or holding elections. It proposes working across four interrelated levels: rebuilding and reforming the organizational structures of state institutions, followed by establishing a national political system starting with drafting a constitution and then holding elections in participatory steps that strengthen the legitimacy of the new order and account for the country’s cultural context and past experiences.

The paper outlines a roadmap that begins with knowledge collection and institutional assessment, followed by restructuring, capacity-building, and the activation of accountability and oversight mechanisms, illustrated through applied examples such as the Ministry of Education. It stresses the importance of aligning reforms with the local context and avoiding the transplantation of ready-made models.

Ultimately, the paper argues that institutional reform is the cornerstone of any successful political transformation. Neglecting this priority poses grave risks to stability, justice, and public trust. Accordingly, it provides a set of recommendations for both the government and relevant organizations, focusing on understanding how the previous institutional system operated, identifying and addressing gaps, and learning from past violations to prevent their recurrence. Additional recommendations include enhancing transparency, utilizing technology to reduce bureaucracy and corruption, investing in human resource development through training, and leveraging the expertise of Syrians both inside and outside the country.

Introduction:

Syria entered a transitional phase in December 2024, following more than a decade since the onset of the Syrian revolution and the subsequent war waged by the former Assad regime against the Syrian people. This conflict, with its military, political, and economic dimensions, resulted in immense material, human, and moral losses due to the regime’s reliance on military solutions to punish its opponents and its solicitation of Iranian and Russian support.

The fall of the former Assad regime led directly to the collapse of the army and security institutions, while many governmental institutions ceased providing certain services for varying periods^[1]. The first interim government, led by Mohammad al-Bashir, managed ministerial and institutional affairs^[2] until the members of the transitional government assumed their duties in early April 2025^[3].

The new government faced a heavy legacy and significant internal and external challenges^[4], including dilapidated institutions and substantial difficulties in delivering public services, especially urgent and emergency services, and this situation was compounded by administrative corruption, institutional inefficiency^[5], an empty state treasury lacking sufficient liquidity, and the necessity of excluding individuals affiliated with the former regime from sensitive positions. Additionally, numerous cases of injustice and corruption had surfaced publicly^[6].

The government encountered major challenges in managing existing institutions, made mistakes, issued decisions it later retracted^[7], and these problems became more apparent in newly established institutions created in haste, such as the security apparatus and the army, which revealed a pressing need for restructuring, training, and oversight, particularly in light of previous errors and violations^[8].

It can be said that there is broad consensus on the necessity of rebuilding Syria’s public institutions to support the envisioned future of the state and to align with aspirations for rapid economic openness and recovery from the impacts of the prior war. Various proposals have been made regarding the steps needed to overcome these challenges, often focusing on general contexts such as calls for legal and constitutional reform, initiating transitional justice processes^[9], and drawing lessons from similar case studies^[10].

Despite the importance of this intellectual momentum, its practical implementation has remained limited. Some argue that it has largely remained theoretical—describing problems and recommending solutions—without reaching mechanisms for practical execution that would achieve the level of stability necessary for an effective political transition. Thus, it became crucial to present a detailed vision that could assist policymakers in taking the initial steps to rebuild the key components of the state properly.

Most attention, effort, and focus during transitional phases are often directed toward political and security aspects, such as drafting a new constitution, guaranteeing freedoms, establishing political parties, launching transitional justice processes, and disarming militias. Meanwhile, institutional rebuilding receives comparatively less attention and rarely addresses deeper levels, which hinders efforts to ensure security, provide justice for victims, combat corruption, and deliver public services in line with citizens’ expectations of an immediate transition to a new system. This process frequently encounters bureaucratic obstacles, a shortage of qualified personnel, and a heavy legacy of violations and injustices committed by some institutions under the former regime.

This paper seeks to provide a practical framework based on a body of established literature and global evidence produced by specialized international institutions with extensive experience. Utilizing both desk research and foresight methodologies, it aims to address the following questions:

• Where does the process of rebuilding institutions rank within the priorities of political transition?
• What practical steps are required to rebuild institutions in post-Assad Syria to become competent and effective?

The paper is structured as follows: the first section examines the relationship between state fragility and peace; the second discusses priorities in transitional phases, weighing the construction of a new political system against institutional rebuilding; the third section addresses key areas of focus in the institutional reconstruction process; the fourth presents a preliminary roadmap to understand the required stages of reform; and the final section concludes with a set of findings and recommendations for policymakers and relevant stakeholders.

1. Fragile States and the Peacebuilding Process

The concept of a “fragile state” provides a framework for understanding the vulnerabilities that can generate internal and external conflicts. Fragility often leads to a significant imbalance in the relationship between the state and society, increases the likelihood of disputes and humanitarian disasters, raises the risk of state collapse, and produces crises that may extend beyond national borders^[11].

Interest in monitoring fragile states has intensified because they increasingly pose threats to international security. Such states may engage in human rights violations, generate internal crises and conflicts that trigger mass migration, serve as fertile grounds for extremist groups, or devolve into lawless territories. Furthermore, institutional weakness often invites external interventions, undermining sovereignty and creating pressures that facilitate interference in domestic affairs^[12].

When formal state institutions collapse during or after conflicts, authority does not disappear entirely but rather transforms. In many cases, alternative powers fill the vacuum, exercising different forms of governance—whether through armed control, the provision of services, or the enforcement of informal local laws. Consequently, the state becomes a nominal façade, and the legitimacy of law and its institutions erodes, complicating future efforts at institutional reconstruction^[13].

Post-conflict states often prioritize establishing security and rebuilding the army and police forces while neglecting judicial, institutional, and administrative reforms. This approach tends to produce a fragile security environment grounded in coercion rather than legitimacy, potentially reproducing the violations that initially triggered the conflict^[14].

In the context of states^[15], it is important to distinguish between the scope of state functions—i.e., the tasks and services it provides—and its capacity to execute these functions effectively and fairly. For instance, a state may maintain strong security apparatuses but suffer from administrative weaknesses in basic public services, thereby bearing significant responsibilities without possessing the effective tools for implementation. This gap results in institutional failure^[16].

A state’s primary legitimacy derives from voluntary societal acceptance, recognition of its authority and institutions, adherence to its laws, and the perception that it represents and serves the public interest. Such legitimacy is the foundation for stability and sustainability. Coercive control, enforced compliance, repression of freedoms, and intimidation may temporarily establish order, but they do not build trust. Once coercive power diminishes, the system collapses^[17], as occurred in Syria.

During the Assad regime, Syria consistently ranked high on global fragility indicators. In 2011, it was placed in the “Red Alert” category (ranked 48th), signaling imminent collapse requiring urgent intervention. Despite these warnings, the regime ignored the indicators for years, persisting with the same policies until the situation exploded into revolution. By insisting on military solutions and invoking external intervention, the regime further deteriorated the situation, with Syria ranking fourth globally on the 2024 Fragile States Index, scoring 108.1 points in the “High Alert” category (see Table 1)^[18].

The Fragile States Index, developed by the Peace Fund^[19], serves as a critical tool for identifying areas that could push a state toward collapse. It focuses on a set of sub-indicators, including: Cohesion indicators, which assess security apparatuses, fragmented elites, and social grievances; Economic indicators, which examine economic decline, uneven development, and brain drain; Political indicators, which evaluate state legitimacy, public service delivery, human rights, and the rule of law; and Social indicators, which track demographic pressures, displaced populations, refugees, and external intervention^[20].

Social and Comprehensive Indicators			Political Indicators			Economic Indicators				Cohesion Indicators			Total Points		Grade		Year
Foreign Interference	Displaced Persons and Refugees	Demographic Pressures	Human Rights and The Rule of Law	Public Services	State Legitimacy		Human Capital Flight	Unequal Economic Development	Economic Decline	Collective Grievances	Divided Elites	Security Services
10.0	9.2	8.2	8.8	9.1	10.0		7.7	6.6	9.9	8.8	9.9	9.7	108.1	4		2024
10.0	10.0	8.2	9.9	9.3	9.9		8.1	7.8	8.5	9.9	9.9	9.9	111.4	4		2018
5.6	8.5	5.6	8.6	5.8	8.6		6.3	7.4	5.8	8.7	7.9	7.5	85.9	48		2011
6.2	7.1	7.0	9.0	5.5	9.5		6.8	8.9	6.5	8.0	7.1	7.5	88.6	33		2006

Table 1: Syria according to global fragility measures, 2006-2011-2018-2024^[21]

The figures presented in Table 1 indicate that, prior to the outbreak of the revolution, Syria faced very serious challenges in areas such as social grievances, uneven development, state legitimacy, human rights, and the rule of law. The country also exhibited clear deficiencies in its security apparatus, fragmented elite structures, demographic pressures, and the management of displaced populations and refugees.

Considering this long-standing legacy of chronic fragility, whose impacts accumulated over the years, the situation deteriorated sharply after 2011, reaching unprecedented levels across economic, political, and social dimensions, including societal cohesion. With the country entering a new phase, it has become essential to address these issues and mitigate the deep-seated fragility embedded within the state and its institutions, as such fragility increases the likelihood of conflict recurrence—even in new forms—and significantly affects economic recovery, service provision, and the promotion of security and justice, which are among the priorities in transitional phases.

2. Political System Building or Institutional Building: Which Comes First to Strengthen Peace in Transitional Phases?

Peacebuilding after conflicts has been a key international endeavor implemented in many countries and regions under the supervision of UN bodies and agencies. Practices have often emphasized elections, privatization, and market liberalization as mechanisms for promoting stability. However, on-the-ground realities have demonstrated that replicating these processes using imported models rarely produces peace, particularly when these models disregard the local context and its particularities. The result is that such interventions often fail to create stable systems, instead reproducing the fragility that heightens the risk of renewed conflict^[22].

Theoretical peacebuilding approaches assume the existence of an established and stable state, whose institutions can be relied upon to implement necessary measures. In reality, post-conflict states frequently experience an absence of state authority or institutional fragility, which weakens implementation efforts. Therefore, the reconstruction of state institutions becomes a prerequisite for stability, as strong institutions—including an independent judiciary, free media, neutral security forces, and an active civil society—serve as the guarantors of a successful transition^[23].

Supporting this hypothesis, studies of post-conflict countries have analyzed factors contributing to failures and the challenges encountered. Results indicate that institution-building constitutes an essential foundation prior to the implementation of democracy and economic liberalization. For example, in Kosovo, despite the administrative authority of the United Nations in the region, delays in security consolidation and institutional development produced negative outcomes. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, despite initial success in securing public order, authoritarian practices resurfaced due to the absence of strong institutions^[24].

The absence or weakness of state institutions, coupled with the lack of an independent judiciary, effective agencies, and capable security forces, undermines the state’s ability to enforce laws, maintain security, and manage the economy. Widespread corruption further compromises the entire political process, eroding cultural norms and values, privileging personal loyalties over competence, and weakening public trust in the state. Consequently, institutions become instruments controlled by military elites or ruling parties rather than serving the public interest^[25].

Why Institutional Building is a Priority

The transition to a participatory political system begins with comprehensive administrative reform of bureaucratic institutions, emphasizing institutional independence—particularly within oversight and judicial bodies—and fostering a culture of public service and administrative integrity. Effective political conflict management and law enforcement are necessary to prevent the collapse of the system or the reproduction of prior authoritarian practices^[26].

The existence of national, effective, legitimate, and constitutionally constrained institutions forms the foundation for regulating political and economic competition and ensures that hasty elections do not reproduce authoritarianism. Just as the absence of a functional state leads to chaotic competition, where institutions fail to regulate freedoms or resolve political disputes, rebuilding state institutions must come first to prepare an environment conducive to free and sustainable stability and peace. This state must be both capable, possessing tools for law enforcement and service delivery, and constrained, operating under a constitution and balanced separation of powers rather than arbitrary rule^[27].

The state is the guarantor of freedoms, and experience demonstrates that liberties cannot be exercised, protected, or consolidated without an effective and capable state. The “Institutionalization Before Liberalization (IBL)” strategy^[28] advocates rebuilding security, judiciary, and administrative institutions before undertaking constitutional drafting and elections. Implementing this strategy requires political will, international support, and funding, while facing multiple challenges, including external pressures to rapidly produce a new system, lack of international coordination and support, financial and temporal costs, and resistance from local elites who favor quick elections over a long-term, thorough reform process^[29].

A functioning state encompasses more than authority and sovereignty; it depends on effective public administration to enforce laws, collect taxes, and implement public policies. As the capacity for public administration declines, the state becomes an empty structure, undermining its legitimacy^[30].

In-depth studies indicate that state-building begins not with the constitution but with the civil servant, the accountant, and the traffic officer. Assuming that administration will develop automatically over time without investment in infrastructure is erroneous. Administrative reform is therefore crucial as a long-term investment, enabling the construction of a professional, neutral bureaucracy staffed by competent personnel, continuously trained, and protected from political interference through legislation that prohibits direct political influence on appointments and administrative decisions^[31].

In the Syrian context, citizens anticipate a smooth and effective political transition that allows them to recover from years of dictatorship, restricted freedoms, and a constrained civil society. While attention often focuses on conventional steps—such as selecting a new legislative council and drafting a constitution—these measures alone are insufficient to achieve stability or convince Syrians that genuine change has occurred. Political steps require time, preconditions, and a degree of security and stability that the current state institutions, still operating under their old, inefficient, and corruption-prone legal and administrative frameworks, cannot provide. Moreover, the previous judicial system is incapable of addressing new challenges and requires substantive reforms to restore rights^[32], hold violators accountable across different positions, and address administrative inefficiencies^[33] and bureaucracy designed to control and exploit citizens^[34].

Conducting any electoral process necessitates the presence of genuine institutions capable of providing accurate information about the new realities, including the number and distribution of Syrians participating in the process. Ensuring the necessary environment for such an exercise also requires established security institutions and a judicial system capable of resolving disputes, complaints, and political conflicts. Furthermore, providing citizens with basic services in a dignified manner increases their willingness to participate and contribute effectively once their essential needs are met. This, in turn, enhances the legitimacy of the government in their eyes and encourages investors and international donors to engage with the market, confident in the presence of well-governed, corruption-free institutions capable of protecting and facilitating their investments.

3. Institutional Reconstruction: Key Focus Areas

Indicators of weak public administration are manifested in several ways, including the absence of competent personnel and effective administrative structures, lack of mechanisms to regulate revenues, the growing influence of certain local or sectarian groups, and the absence of oversight and accountability mechanisms, which generates chronic corruption. Institutions in fragile states often struggle to balance delegation with oversight, limiting efficiency and innovation. Furthermore, the absence of clear, measurable objectives hinders institutional performance, rendering operations ambiguous, roles overlapping, and authority blurred. As a result, accountability becomes difficult, and assessments are subject to personal impressions and political considerations^[35].

Some experts suggest that state-building requires action at four levels, with knowledge transfer from other contexts feasible only at the first level. These levels include^[36]:

1. Organizational Design: covering the bureaucratic and institutional structure of the state.
2. Political System Design: including whether the system is presidential, parliamentary, federal, etc., and the organization of relationships between state components.
3. Foundations of Legitimacy.
4. Social and Cultural Factors.

Levels of Building State Institutions	Level Properties	Focus Areas
Organizational Design and Management	Easiest level; can be learned from similar contexts.	It focuses on the state’s bureaucratic and institutional structure, namely: • How are ministries organized? • How are services administered? • What are the powers and responsibilities? • What is the nature of the relationship between the center government and the governorates? • What are the decision-making and delegation processes?
Political System Design	Complicated; influenced by past experiences, local forces, and community structure	It concerns how state authority is organized and the balance of power: • What is the nature of the system (presidential, parliamentary, or mixed)? • Is the state centralized or decentralized? • How is the executive branch elected? • How independent is the judiciary? • What is the relationship between the military and civil government?
Foundations of Legitimacy	It is affected by the challenges of external interference and the exploitation of legitimacy by some elites.	A state’s legitimacy is not built solely on ballot boxes or force, but rather on: • People’s sense that the government represents them. • Social acceptance of the law and institutions. • A sense of belonging to the state itself.
Cultural and Social Factors	Important in determining the reformability of institutions and the ability of society to accept them.	It is related to the values, identities, and social traditions that shape citizens’ perceptions of the state: • Do people see the state as serving them or dominating them? • How much do people trust the law? • Is family or tribe more important than state institutions? • Is there a willingness to accept equality and freedom of expression?

Table 2:Levels of Building State Institution

Recognizing that many attempts failed due to assumptions that institutions could be reformed by importing ready-made systems, without acknowledging that institutions are long-standing cultural products, deeply embedded in context. Social, religious, and tribal specificities must be considered, alongside the identification of de facto power holders, patterns of entrenched legitimacy, and public perceptions of the state. Reconstruction must proceed gradually, aiming at genuine reform rather than merely meeting the demands of external aid^[37].

Governmental institutional reform is feasible but slow and complex, requiring administrative expertise and political understanding of the context. Successful reform focuses on rules and processes more than behaviors and mindsets, with local ownership being a key success factor. Following assessment, a realistic, phased, and flexible reform plan must be developed in parallel with institutional capacity-building and participatory processes. Democratic transition phases provide an opportunity for such initiatives, emphasizing behavioral and organizational culture through incentives, prioritizing core issues such as transparency and anti-corruption, and ensuring continuity in the long-term process, independent of political disputes^[38].

Post-conflict public administration reconstruction is not merely a technical task; it must address legitimacy, justice, and trust. Rebuilding trust in state institutions and balancing efficiency with social and political legitimacy is critical to ensuring inclusivity, achieving what is known as “negotiated legitimacy.” Efficiency alone is insufficient to gain public trust; without legitimacy, institutions risk becoming instruments of control that exacerbate divisions. A gradual and participatory approach, grounded in local adaptation and innovation and involving the community, is therefore necessary. New policies should be tested incrementally, learning from errors and making adjustments as needed^[39].

Local capacity-building requires reducing dependence on international experts and foreign institutions, investing in domestic human capital, launching talent attraction programs, establishing twinning initiatives with other countries, and conducting periodic evaluations of ministry performance. It is also important to enhance citizens’ perception of the state through consistent payment of salaries, population registration, and issuance of essential documents^[40].

Focusing solely on organizational structures or rapid institutional reactivation is insufficient without institutional learning, which prevents failures from being reproduced in new frameworks. Institutional learning includes developing performance evaluation systems, fostering a culture of error recognition, converting routine reports into analyzable and measurable tools, collecting and documenting lessons learned, and periodically revising policies. Training and capacity-building should become routine, with staff encouraged to document and disseminate knowledge. Systems for archiving and policy documentation must also be strengthened to preserve accumulated experience and expertise^[41].

Strong, effective, and legitimate institutions are essential for achieving peace, stability, and development. Without them, service delivery, law enforcement, and trust restoration between the state and citizens are unattainable. Understanding the local context and its challenges is fundamental for developing and activating administrative systems. Government institutions possess both horizontal and vertical reach across the entire territory, representing the state directly to citizens and performing functions that reshape the state-society relationship and reduce threats.

Despite efforts in Syria to manage the transitional period, attract expertise, and reactivate institutions, government performance remains inconsistent. Increasing errors by the General Security Directorate^[42], the resurgence of theft, murder, and kidnapping cases^[43], delays in property transfers and civil registration^[44], bureaucratic obstacles in obtaining official documents such as passports, continued weaknesses in services like internet and electricity despite promises and signed projects, and the lack of a government plan to rebuild damaged areas and address returning displaced populations and refugees—all these factors contribute to the perception of a weak or absent state, particularly in service-oriented institutions that directly affect citizens’ lives.

4. How to Start? (A Roadmap)

Numerous studies produced by reputable institutions offer actionable roadmaps based on accumulated experiences and lessons learned, helping to avoid “reinventing the wheel” and repeating past mistakes^[45]. Some of these frameworks emphasize the need to understand the current institutional context, analyze the political and institutional environment, map power structures, and identify those who hold influence and the capacity to drive change. They also highlight the importance of distinguishing between visible and hidden obstacles to government performance, such as sectarian dynamics or interest networks^[46].

These approaches further focus on analyzing actors’ motivations and expected behaviors, formal and informal rules governing individual conduct, and the historical, cultural, and political factors that shaped the environment. They emphasize understanding deterrents and incentives affecting actors, studying the historical context to interpret why current policies are failing, identifying patterns of marginalization and institutional monopolies, understanding resistance to change, and mapping how the situation reached its current state^[47].

To simplify and synthesize these insights, a conceptual model can be proposed for areas requiring knowledge and information gathering before launching a comprehensive and gradual institutional reform process (Figure 1). This includes:

1. Classification of public institutions by functional domain: Each institution requires specialized studies and targeted reform strategies tailored to its mandate.
2. Analysis of the previous institutional context and affiliations: Assess the institution’s connection to the former regime and its involvement in abuses, especially for those that acted as instruments of systematic repression or were heavily politicized. Future plans can then be based on their reformability or the need for dismantling, particularly for justice-related institutions^[48].
3. Assessment of current conditions and requirements: Evaluate infrastructure, human resources, administrative and legal systems, and financial capacity.
4. Consideration of the specific Syrian context and historical-political background: Examine how these factors affect performance and how emerging gaps can be addressed.

Figure 1: Knowledge Required Before Implementing Any Institutional Reform

After completing the initial phase, the next step involves developing detailed plans for each ministry and its relevant institutions. This phase should include a comprehensive assessment and diagnosis, analyzing the current situation, identifying needs, and determining the causes of past failures. This should then be followed by a stage of accountability and functional audit, holding those responsible accountable through a fair and transparent institutional mechanism^[49].

Subsequently, restructuring should occur at multiple levels: regulations and laws, human resources, institutional values, identification of required skills and expertise, and allocation of necessary resources. To ensure proper implementation, the new system must incorporate robust governance mechanisms that prevent the reproduction of previous failures. This can be achieved through the establishment of oversight bodies, transparency and accountability frameworks at both governmental and societal levels, while promoting institutional culture and active community participation. The ultimate goal is to achieve effective and impactful Syrian institutions governed by oversight, equipped with a solid legal framework capable of delivering programs and strategic visions that guide the country toward stability.

Figure 2: Institutional Reform Plan.

As an illustrative step toward practical implementation, this roadmap proposes an approach to reforming the pre-university education system in Syria. This involves mapping and assessing the current status of the Ministry of Education, one of the most influential service ministries, which shapes future generations, instills civic values, and promotes citizenship.

This approach provides an initial, adaptable action plan that can be simulated and adjusted for application across other ministries or institutions. The evaluation of the Ministry of Education relies on examining its condition before, during, and after the revolution across all areas of influence, encompassing both formal and non-formal education, and incorporating the perspectives of relevant stakeholders as well as available official documents and reports (Figure 3).

In addition to evaluating infrastructure, personnel, and curricula—which are major focus areas—the assessment must consider the students themselves, their needs, the degree of politicization of the education system, and the ministry’s involvement in previous violations. The evaluation should also examine the structural, functional, and legal frameworks, as well as the level of societal legitimacy, trust, and reformability.

Acquiring this information is challenging but constitutes the first essential step toward accurately assessing the current situation. Understanding the impact of past and present local contexts allows for the identification of institutional gaps, conflicting interests, and required resources, ensuring the restructuring of these institutions aligns with citizen expectations.

Figure 3: Evaluation of the Reality of the Syrian Ministry of Education and Its Institutions.

Based on the outputs of the comprehensive assessment, subsequent phases can be implemented according to the proposed timeline, with parallel execution possible as indicated in the following table (Table 3).

Stage	Time Period	Main Goals	Recommended Activities
1- Evaluation and Diagnosis	4-8 months	Understanding the current reality of educational institutions	– Evaluations of infrastructure, curricula, and staff. – Analysis of the political, social, legal, and administrative context. – Classification of schools according to the degree of damage.
2- Strategic Planning	3-6 months	Develop a comprehensive national vision and plan	– Formulating reform objectives. – Defining sectoral priorities. – Engaging civil society and donors.
3- Institutional Restructuring	6-9 months	Reforming administrative and legal structures	– Amending regulatory regulations. – Establishing oversight and accountability units. – Separating educational authorities from political influence.
4- Building Human Capacities	Continuous for 3 years	Development of educational and administrative staff	– Training teachers and principals. – Establishing a National Institute for Educational Administration. – Programs to attract Syrian talents from abroad.
5- Updating Curricula and Educational Methods	1-2 years	Aligning education with the needs of society and the labor market	– Reviewing current curricula. – Introducing digital education and life skills. – Strengthening vocational and technical education.
6- Rehabilitation of Schools and Infrastructure	2-5 years	Providing a safe and inclusive learning environment	– Restoration of damaged schools. – Establishment of mobile schools in remote areas. – Equipping schools with basic equipment.
7- Evaluation and Monitoring	Continuous	Ensuring quality implementation and improving performance	– Developing performance indicators. – Issuing periodic reports. – Amending policies based on results.

Table 3:Proposed timeline for completing the education system reform process in Syria

5. Findings and Recommendations

Transitional phases in cases of political change—particularly following prolonged conflict—are characterized by extreme sensitivity and a heightened risk of renewed violence. This is especially true when institutional structures are weak, when there is a legacy of violations committed by certain institutions, and when segments of society benefiting from the status quo resist change. However, fragile peace that typically accompanies political transitions cannot evolve into genuine peace without rebuilding public institutions, which constitute the cornerstone of a sustainable political transition. These institutions serve as the primary guarantors of rights and freedoms, reassuring citizens of the birth of a fundamentally new political order.

Rebuilding institutions must be a top priority for the transitional government, based on a genuine conviction in the importance of this step for enhancing the country’s resilience against the re-emergence of a new authoritarian order. Transitional phases often carry a strong societal desire for real change and provide an opportunity to bolster the legitimacy of the new political system.

Neglecting or delaying the launch of a comprehensive reform process would mean missing a critical opportunity to achieve profound policy transformation, attract external financial and technical support to stabilize the country, strengthen peacebuilding, and prevent renewed conflict. Conversely, it would risk reproducing the old regime’s laws, policies, and dysfunctional structures—albeit with new faces—thereby undermining public trust in the prospect of genuine change and fostering nostalgic attachment to the past, which, despite its flaws, appeared more stable.

Institutional reform cannot be achieved merely by recruiting trained experts or replacing a few leaders and administrators. Such measures alone will not suffice to establish new institutions unless reform starts from the foundational levels: organizational rules, legal frameworks, administrative structures, and the systematic identification of weaknesses, conflicts of interest, and the impact of previous policies on institutional performance. A new governance system must be designed—transparent, accountable, and responsive—to rebuild public trust and ensure efficient service delivery.

Rebuilding public institutions is undoubtedly a complex and arduous endeavor; yet it is both essential and indispensable. It generates internal legitimacy, improves relations between government and citizens, and fosters citizen commitment to sustaining the system, provided it is based on transparency, justice, participation, and the pursuit of the public good. Strong institutions also reinforce security and economic stability, encourage investors and stakeholders to return, and support the reconstruction process.

Ultimately, building robust institutions constitutes the primary safeguard for a fair and sustainable political transition in Syria. Such institutions will serve as the guarantor of freedoms, political competition, and conflict resolution, guiding the country through recovery and progress, managing market liberalization and investment flows, preventing relapse into civil war, enhancing international legitimacy, and facilitating the effective management of foreign aid and grants.

Policy Recommendations

To the Transitional Government:

1. Develop a comprehensive national plan for institutional reform within a clear transitional framework, and establish a specialized body under the Ministry of Administrative Development tasked with planning, implementation, and oversight.
2. Focus institutional rebuilding on reforming organizational rules, structural frameworks, and legal foundations, while simultaneously addressing behavioral and attitudinal change. Behavioral shifts are more readily achieved within a disciplined, accountable system, enabling staff to comply with and embrace the spirit of new institutions.
3. Adopt flexible, phased reform strategies with clearly defined objectives and measurable performance indicators, subject to periodic review and adjustment based on evolving conditions.
4. Leverage technology to reduce bureaucratic inefficiencies, combat corruption, and improve service quality.
5. Invest seriously in capacity-building for institutional staff, particularly at mid-level management, which serves as the critical link between policymakers and executors.
6. Establish an effective system of internal monitoring and auditing that produces transparent periodic reports and tracks performance indicators.
7. Strengthen partnerships with research and knowledge institutions specializing in governance and reform, enabling problem-solving and system development.
8. Promote community participation in planning and oversight of institutional rebuilding to increase legitimacy and draw on citizens’ perspectives regarding desired services.
9. Create a digital archiving system to record lessons learned, document experiences, and ensure continuous institutional learning.
10. Revitalize the National Institute of Public Administration and expand its mandate to include governance system development, while incorporating advanced administrative sciences into university curricula.
11. Launch programs to attract skilled Syrian professionals from the diaspora, integrating their expertise into national reform efforts.

To Civil Society and Community Actors:

1. Encourage Syrian professionals to engage in designing and implementing institutional reform programs, fostering initiatives that translate criticism into structured reform projects and developmental proposals.
2. Support scholarships and training opportunities for outstanding students in governance and public administration studies.
3. Develop short-term, targeted training programs for current administrative staff tailored to each institution’s needs, complementing broader capacity-building plans.
4. Raise public awareness regarding the importance of participation, oversight, constructive criticism, and societal accountability in strengthening institutional performance.

To Donors and International Organizations:

1. Support institutional reform plans that are grounded in local assessments and sensitive to cultural context.
2. Fund capacity-building, institutional evaluation, and reform programs, while providing technical expertise and promoting local ownership of the process.
3. Avoid imposing ready-made models and instead provide flexible support rooted in genuine partnerships with local stakeholders.