Syria and the “Israeli” Threat: Between Shifts in the Regional Security Environment, Coercive Pressures, and Response Options
Executive Summary:
Syria today finds itself at the heart of a turbulent regional environment in which balances of power are shifting at an unprecedented pace. Within this context, the rise of increasingly extremist currents inside “Israel” has elevated the level of direct threat to southern Syria and generated new military and political realities that go beyond traditional security pretexts. The “Israeli” attack on Qatar, accompanied by an expansive discourse reviving notions of “Greater Israel,” has contributed to redefining perceptions of threat among Gulf states, Egypt, and Turkey. It has also opened the door to strategic transformations, including the strengthening of new defense partnerships, an expanded Chinese presence, and declining confidence in U.S. security guarantees.
Within this volatile setting, U.S. credibility—despite Washington’s efforts to absorb regional anger—appears to be eroding. Previous arrangements, ranging from designating Qatar as a “major non-NATO ally” to the deployment of advanced U.S. forces, failed to prevent the “Israeli” strike.
At the same time, ongoing Russian violations in Eastern Europe and the 2015 incident in which Turkey shot down a Russian aircraft illustrate the limits of the American security umbrella and its capacity to deter real threats. This places any proposed “security guarantee” in Syrian–“Israeli” negotiations under a cloud of doubt, especially given Washington’s overt bias in favor of “Israel.”
Parallel to this, “Israeli” ambitions in southern Syria are increasingly revealed as a project that goes beyond the concept of a mere “buffer zone.” Tel Aviv combines security discourse with a religious–ideological backdrop rooted in Jewish religious narratives, presenting its control as a form of “historical restoration.” These narratives have been accompanied by political efforts to revive claims over old Jewish properties in Hauran and the Golan, and by shocking public statements portraying Damascus as part of an “Israeli-targeted geopolitical space.”
Security negotiation agendas between Damascus and “Israel” likewise appear to extend beyond border arrangements toward attempts to reinsert the new Syrian state into a broader regional architecture. U.S.–“Israeli” proposals have reportedly included establishing a U.S. military presence near Damascus, linking sanctions relief to Syria’s accession to the “Abraham Accords,” and securing implicit Syrian acceptance of the “Israeli” occupation of the Golan, in addition to hints regarding potential roles in the disarmament of “Hezbollah” and even “Hamas.”
This complex environment places the new Syria before four principal paths: outright rejection of pressures; cautious positive adaptation; limited openness driven by necessity; or broad normalization that would grant “Israel” far-reaching strategic gains. Analysis of the available data suggests that the most viable course is calibrated positive adaptation: rejecting normalization and any erosion of sovereignty, while managing regional complexities in a balanced manner and avoiding being drawn into an uncalculated military confrontation.
Such an approach requires strengthening internal resilience through activating the role of the new parliament, constructing a clear national narrative that frames southern Syria as a daily frontline with occupation, and demonstrating explicit alignment with populations facing “Israeli” aggression. It also necessitates launching a comprehensive national program to address the “Israeli” threat, integrating security, political, and media tools, enhancing state maneuverability, and preventing international pressure from being converted into imposed normalization or dangerous sovereign concessions.
Turkey’s experience following the “twelve-day war” between “Israel” and Iran—when Ankara began preparing for potential confrontation despite its relative strength and stability—demonstrates that recognizing strategic threats is not a theoretical luxury but a security imperative. If Turkey deemed it necessary to prepare for confrontation scenarios, then Syria, already at the center of “Israeli” targeting, is even more in need of a comprehensive national doctrine for managing this threat.
In light of all the above, the new Syria has an opportunity to redefine its regional position by adopting a path that balances steadfastness on national constants with flexible movement within a new web of regional equilibria—without becoming a coerced or subordinate actor, and without embarking on military adventures that lead to painful outcomes.
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باحث ومستشار، كتب و شارك في كتابة العديد من الأوراق المتعلقة بالملف السوري. كما عمل مستشاراً وباحثاً في الشأن السوري لدى عدة مراكز سياسات سورية ناشئة، ولدى منظمات دولية. مدرب في مجال أساسيات ريادة الأعمال وأساسيات التحليل السياسي،
