Diasporic Syrian Activism in the US: Successes and Challenges

Introduction

This commentary offers a critical assessment of Syrian anti-Assad advocacy and lobbying efforts in the United States. Alongside transitional justice advancements that seek to prosecute Assad regime officials in international courts,[1] the efforts of Syria’s transnational or diasporic activists in the US mark the most recent visible gains in the international politics of Syria’s revolution/war. Successes from the ‘Ceasar Act’ to the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization bill still in the works demonstrate impressive learning by a new grassroots coalition that has acquired extensive skills and know-how pertaining to the US legislative system. Certainly, activists must bear in mind the uncertainty posed by US elections later in the year and the backdrop of a very complex Middle East where the war in Gaza still grinds on, as does the state of continued uncertainties. As we bear witness to US-enabled genocide in Palestine, however the knottiest challenges are internal and ethical in nature, relating to principles and modes of civic and political mobilization.

Diasporic Activists in the US

Understanding the trajectory of Syrian diasporic activism in the US requires a set of analytical tools different from analyzing the anti-authoritarian bottom-up hirak in Syria or even in nearby Turkey. Here the highly institutionalized policymaking environment within democratic states allows perhaps for less creativity and improvisation, but more stability and predictability, than civic and political activism within Syria or even neighboring Turkey. In her book on the transnational activist elements of Arab Spring revolutions, sociologist Dana Moss suggests that Syrian diaspora activists in the US were more effective than their British counterparts in “forg[ing] a robust set of advocacy and relief organizations and continuing lobbying” as the revolution descended into an increasingly bloody and complicated war.[2] A few groups, most notably the Syrian American Council established in 2005, had been formed by Syrians prior to 2011. It was only as the revolution gained steam, however, that Syrian exiles and first- or second-generation immigrants really activated their political advocacy to eventually call for an end to the Assad regime. This kind of advocacy has included not just dissemination of information about regime atrocities and violence. Activists who functioned as self-styled “representatives” of revolutionaries and their demands[3] have also pushed for United Nations as well as US involvement against Assad, through political support for Syrian political opposition and military support of anti-Assad fighters, most publicly to the Free Syrian Army to the MOC and MOM in Jordan and Turkey.

Yet as Moss admits, diasporic activists can only gain an audience and impact states’ policies in line with their own goals insofar as their demands fit within a broader frame of “long-standing geopolitical orientation[s]” of said states.[4] Relatedly, Lantis mentions “civil society groups like the Syrian Opposition Coalition to the United Nations” (that supported “continued engagement”) as a (small) part of competing “advocacy coalitions” made up of government and non-government actors. Debates and shifting influence of groups including American thinktanks such as CSIS, the Heritage Foundation, and the Atlantic Council, help explain the ups and downs of the US policy “grudging engagement” in Syria from the Obama administration through the Trump administration.[5]

Learning Advocacy

More systematic empirical analysis is required to ascertain the precise impact of Syrian groups on any anti-Assad legislation at various stages of the policymaking process. The point is that even as they might help shape some of its contours, it would be a stretch to assert that Syrian activists are themselves driving US policy, or that of any other state (e.g. Turkey). There is a strong momentum in the passage of laws: the Caesar Syria Civilian Protections Act, the CAPTAGON Act,[6] the ‘Captagon 2’ Act which has passed the House of Representatives, and the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, which has also passed in the House of Representatives. However, these legislative accomplishments cannot be attributed entirely to diasporic groups including group such as the American Coalition for Syria[7], the Syrian Emergency Taskforce[8], and Global Justice. Yet it is certain that organized activists, including but not limited to those known in opposition or social media, have skilfully inserted themselves into the US policymaking process.

Here they have drawn on the democratic knowledge, or set of civic orientations, attitudes, values, and practices[9] honed over at least thirteen years, in pursuit of influencing international and American policy on Syria. Networking; communication; normative appeals[10]; fund-raising; reporting; non-profit governance and decision-making; reaching out to voters across states; coalition-building among Syrians, the national security establishment, and Congress, are hard-won organizational and political skills now part of their repertoire. So is a very detailed understanding of a convoluted policymaking process within a complex system where foreign policy is to some extent divided between the executive (the White House) and legislative (Congress) branches can be at odds. This is acumen developed not just through high levels of education (such as graduate degrees in law and leadership), but knowledge borne of experience in the political trenches, so to speak.

Thus, it is no accident that Syrian American advocacy and lobbying groups seem to have shifted away from a focus on the Biden White House they see as largely unresponsive to their insistence to escalate US pressure against Assad. Instead, their strategy in recent years has been a legislative one, “reaffirming Congress’s pivotal role in shaping a new US policy towards Syria.”[11] It is only a close understanding of how they system functions that could have enabled such an approach. Specific policy objectives of Syria’s diasporic activists have centered around sanctioning the Assad regime and preventing the resumption of diplomatic and economic ties (normalization) with any Syrian government of which Bashar Assad remains at the helm. It is common knowledge that United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254, the farthest the ‘international community’ has gone in prescribing some sort of political transition in Syria, has long ago hit a dead end since its passage in 2015. Perhaps lobbying the US government to pass more and more anti-Assad legislation is among the policy windows that remains open to activists. They are by now well-versed in the constraints and possibilities of foreign and international action towards Syria. That even years of Caesar sanctions do not seem to have become existentially detrimental to the regime which is being slowly let back into the Arab fold does not deter lobbying efforts that seem to advance the same kind of strategy.

The ACS has celebrated the addition of the anti-normalization bill to the US National Defense Authorization Act to be voted on by December 2024[12]. This was after information came to light that the Biden Administration pressured members of Congress to remove the anti-normalization bill from the supplemental bill passed in April 2024 worth $95 billion in aid to Israel, Taiwan, and Ukraine.[13]  Within the frame of American legislation pertaining to anti-Assad Syrians, this change of tack was no doubt a triumph. Most recently, activists have announced that the State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) budgets soon to be voted on in the House of Representatives will now include three new items relevant to Syria: 1.) $15 million in funding for the White Helmets; 2.) special ‘stabilization’ funding for Northwest Syria, previously reserved only for Northeast Syria (i.e. Syrian Democratic Forces territory); and 3.) a prohibition on Bashar Assad and his family from benefiting from any US funding dispensed to Syria.[14]

Of course, diasporic Syrian civil society, academics included, continues to work on more than one front. A great deal of Syrian diasporic civil society efforts focuses on keeping Syria’s revolution and Bashar Assad’s crimes on the American and international political agenda. Families of those killed in Assad prisons, for example, wage campaigns that extend to suing the Syrian government in US courts, is precisely to keep policymakers talking about Syria.[15] In response, perhaps, US Secretary of State has for instance acknowledged the death of Dr. Majd Kamalmaz, demanding “accountability” by the Syrian government “for his fate.”[16] When and by whom such accountability can or will take place is of course unclear.

Activists also contribute to policy debates. The Madaniya civil society umbrella group views itself as a “genuine counterpart” or “key interlocutor for international policymakers, advocating for our values and introducing Syrian civic actors as counterparts in Syria-related decision-making processes.”[17] In what appears to be a supplementary capacity, members of the group are working to identify priorities and policies for long-term Western strategy in Syria. That is a different tack from the more specific policies advocated by the ACS and other groups, in the form of Congressional legislation for sanctions alongside aid. In the new Syria Strategy Project announced by American thinktanks The Atlantic Council and the Middle East Institute, along with the European Institute of Peace, Syrians through Madaniya seem poised to fulfill the role of “broad Syrian engagement.”[18] Some Syrian scholars will pen policy papers as part of this advisory enterprise aimed at piecing together a “holistic strategy to sustainably resolve the Syria crisis.” In this way different diasporic Syrian civil society activists and scholars have entered the fray of a “transatlantic” initiative for the long haul. Part of the rationale for involvement in the Syria Strategy Project, according to those involved, is helping fill the huge gap left by Syrian oppositionists themselves: “There is a problem from our end as Syrians too; we do not have a clear plan for political transition to a free and independent and democratic country.”[19]  Will such thinktank input produce policy impact in directions broadly agreed upon by anti-Assad activists? Syrian academics are one segment among other Western researchers and former diplomats. Neither is it apparent the extent to which their joint recommendations will attempt to gauge the deeply polarized political viewpoints of a highly diverse, highly dispersed Syrian population.

Looking Ahead: Pressing Moral Questions

Any strategy by Syrian groups must bear in mind the overall regional strategy of the US. American administrations can blunder badly before domestic constituencies, possibly at the cost of the presidential election, as Biden’s unapologetic and unequivocal support for Israel may prove.[20] Yet core US interests in the region are relatively constant: protection and support for Israel, access to (cheap) hydrocarbons, counterterrorism and security more broadly. Short-term success by Syrian lobbyists, in keeping Syria on the agenda, ensuring further sanctions on Assad and his close circle, or fending off normalization, must also be viewed within the US’s wider foreign policy towards the Middle East. If lobbyists or advocates think in single-issue terms, the US foreign policy establishment certainly does not. The labyrinthine maze of foreign policymaking is telling. It is not just that when it comes to the “most major and most enduring conflict in the Middle East, the Israel lobby has held outsize influence for quite some time.[21] For instance, that in the years after 9/11, AIPAC successfully lobbied for anti-Assad sanctions laws, sponsored or supported by some of the same staunchly pro-Israel members of Congress who championed the 2019 Caesar Act.[22]

The biggest tests before Syrian diaspora activists are internal. In fact, the most significant challenge may be the elephant in the room. Advocates addressing the US government, who fall in the category of what one scholar has called “solidarity intermediaries” that seek to persuade third parties (e.g. outside states) to support oppressed groups in the homeland,[23] confront heavy ethical questions. Of course calling for external intervention (including Western, including military) in Syria has been in the diplomatic repertoire of activists since the early days of the Syrian National Council.[24]  The point is that enough time has passed to assess past positions in order to chart better new ones. It can be a slippery slope between seeking to contribute to the society to which one has immigrated (or been exiled) towards adopting the militarist, imperialist (and of course pro-Zionist) interests as one’s own, seeking to find points of contact or overlap. Perhaps comparisons during this age of genocide might do us well. It is both important and necessary for activists to organize from below to address various needs of newly diasporized Syrians or family members of Syrian immigrants to Western countries. For instance, Syrian students in Germany have recently formed a union for collective problem-solving and socialization, an organization that also seeks to inculcate democratic practices in what some members see as a form of active civic engagement in the European country.[25]

Advocacy groups in the US have over the years lobbied the Department of Homeland Security to extend the ‘Temporary Protected Status’ of Syrian visa-holders to the country, and kept those concerned informed about the latest developments.[26] However, it is quite another thing for Syrian or any other Arab activists to work within the American political and legislative ‘game’ to further the game itself. Here Syrian ‘solidarity intermediaries’ in the US or any other country should engage in critical questioning of what current and past US interests in the region seem to be, and what that means for a just cause like an anti-authoritarian revolution. In all honesty, what American interests and/or policies (however failed they are) in the Middle East can be said to coincide with interests of any Arab peoples? Are Syrians, whose advocacy groups are just one collective among many, convinced of the establishment US foreign policy tune they are singing? Have they noted what Senator Lindsey Graham, who for many years alongside John McCain was considered by enthusiasts a friend to the Syrian people, has said during this Israeli genocide on Gaza?[27]

All of the above prompts important questions about the (mis)match between Syrian activists’ goals and US agendas in the region, and whether they must reassess their strategies in light of the many unavoidable contradictions. Activists should contemplate deeply the US goals in the Middle East and assess the extent to which they link to their aspirations for freedom and democracy in Syria.

If Assad’s staying power despite American military involvement has not convinced observers of the disconnect between the dignity and freedom (from authoritarianism and imperialism) that Syrians and other Arabs have sought, the genocide in Gaza should give us all pause. University students previously unconnected to American foreign policy are awakening to the disastrous actions of their government in Palestine and perhaps elsewhere. Those who have met repeatedly with American defense and foreign policy officials are arguably much better equipped to point out the ways in which the US bolsters dictators and wide scale slaughter (most recently and dramatically, of Palestinians) in the region. Is the age of genocide not an occasion to rethink and question the moral and ethical bases of activism?

Freedom from Assad or any other Arab dictator is not an American project, in whatever version of US ‘grand strategy’ we have seen play over the years. That much should be obvious. Even the dispensation of humanitarian aid or civil society support has long been a deliberate manifestation of US ‘smart power.’ Such assistance has in no way minimized the military thrust of US foreign policy in the region, particularly since the ‘War on Terror.’[28] On the contrary, the combination of soft and hard power policies, including in Syria, has arguably contributed to the justificatory viability of US imperialism.

This painful moment, then, is an opportunity for Syrian activists, in the US and outside it, to think long and hard about their own ‘grand strategy.’ They might consider the following:

It is likely the case that the organizing and mobilizing efforts would be better spent working more with civil society groups expressing skepticism about US policy in the region and the world. For policy analysts, it is telling that a few thinktanks that explicitly promote democracy and human rights in the region (for example, without assessing their work or approaches here, Middle East Democracy Center, or the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, or Democracy in the Arab World Now) do exist, some funded by US government or US foundation grants. The upshot is that there is some space even in Washington DC to advocate clearly for issues pertinent to the Syrian and other Arab revolutions from perspectives often expressed by Arab or Arab-American writers themselves, including of course Syrians. The point is that political analysis and intellectual contributions remains important in the diaspora.

• Whatever the civil society or government domain they choose to participate in, Syrian activists in the US and outside it can draw particular ethical standards for their work. A commitment to national sovereignty is one such core value. A refusal to engage or court American (or any other country’s) militarism as the minimum threshold of ethical vetting seems a reasonable point of departure, for instance. This is not unheard of among transnational civil society groups who also have a stake in formal domestic and international politics. Women’s organizations such as the Women’s League for International Peace and Freedom rail against militarist policies all the time, whether advocating for the rights of women in Syria or in Palestine.
• Along these lines, the time is more than ripe for internal and collective revisionism among Syrian advocates in the US alongside their counterparts in Istanbul or other global cities. That some US-based activists participated in the most recent Geneva meeting of the Syrian Negotiation Commission[29] is a sign that high-profile members of diasporic Syrian civil society maintain a working relationship. Beyond just calling for ‘the usual’ demands we have heard for many years, these activists and the groups they represent would benefit themselves and their respective Syrian constituencies from frank and reflexive discussion about what they have done right and where they have fallen short of popular expectations since 2011. What lessons can they draw about the tactics and strategies that have worked? Are there minimal thresholds for political advocacy that they might agree on?

• For almost as long as they have existed, Syrian political opposition bodies and large civil society groups have drawn criticism even from anti-Assad Syrians themselves. They suffer from a major trust deficit. To this end, activists would do well to consider how to develop accountability to the Syrians they advocate for. Whether formal, through elections (impossible at this stage), or informal, accountability can be key when it comes to diasporic activists enacting or claiming political representation for a homeland or exiled community, especially when it comes to dealing with third parties and realpolitik dynamics.[30] In addition to better organization, appropriate mechanisms of accountability can help minimize the “risk of…co-optation” by third parties (e.g. the US) who may have other ‘high politics’ interests in mind when supporting diasporic activist causes.[31] The regional (and perhaps global) map, and relevant power relations, are being redrawn, and scepticism of the so-called US led ‘rules-based international order’ is mounting.[32] Syrian activists and opposition politicians would be better served to think about the how (guiding principles and operative procedures) of their work together with the what of their now stale demands (implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254, etc.) that have fallen on deaf ears in an unwilling or uninterested ‘international community.’

Activists of course retain the freedom to work for Syrian interests in whatever ways they so choose. Accomplishing further short-term ‘gains’ in the US Congress is certainly still possible. However, the political imaginaries of Syrian and other revolutionaries seeking emancipation—a moral as well as political cause—have far wider horizons than the narrow and ethically problematic confines of US policymaking.

*Author Bio: Dr. Layla Saleh is a political scientist (PhD University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012) who writes widely on Syrian and Arab politics, the Arab Spring, and Western foreign policy. Her academic publications on Syria include the book US Hard Power in the Arab World: Resistance, the Syrian Uprising, and the War on Terror (Routledge, 2017), the journal article ‘Civic Resilience During Conflict: Syria’s Local Councils’ (2018), and a chapter in the Routledge Handbook on Middle East Politics (Ed. Larbi Sadiki) titled ‘Tentative Notes on Syria’s Uprising: Researching Protest Politics in the Diaspora’ (2020). She is currently Research Fellow at the Graduate School of Humanities and Studies on Public Affairs in Chiba University, Japan.

[1] Most recently in France. See: Associated Press. 2024, May 25. “French Court Sentences 3 Syrian Officials to Life in Prison in Absentia for War Crimes.” https://apnews.com/article/france-syria-war-crimes-trial-28812234653070e6f563dcf5c2b702e7 and Associated Press. 2024, June 26. “Paris Court Upholds Validity of France’s Arrest Warrant for Syrian President Bashar Assad.” https://apnews.com/article/syria-france-assad-war-crimes-arrest-warrant-d64d25b39801dafdcbe031558b52b81b

[2] Dana M. Moss. 2022. The Arab Spring Abroad: Diaspora Activism Against Authoritarian Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 15.

[3] Ibid, p. 170

[4] Ibid, pp. 204-5

[5] Lantis, J. S. 2020. “Advocacy Coalitions and Foreign Policy Change: Understanding US Responses to the Syrian Civil War.” Journal of Global Security Studies 6(1). pp. 11-13.

[6] Congress.gov. 2022. H.R.625-117th Congress (2021-2022): CAPTAGON Act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/6265/text

[7] The formation of the coalition was announced on October 22, 2021, after a meeting held in Washington that included representatives of several organizations operating in the United States. The coalition seeks to “empower the Syrian-American community to organize and advocate for a free, democratic, secular, and pluralistic Syria.”

[8] According to the organization’s official website, it was established in March 2011 “in response to the presence of the Syrian dictatorship and its allies who are waging war on innocent civilians.” Headquartered in Washington, D.C., it says it “works tirelessly in Syria to end the killing, through advocacy in the courts, humanitarian initiatives, and seeking justice and accountability for war crimes.”

[9] Sadiki, Larbi. 2015. “Towards a ‘Democratic Knowledge’ Turn? Knowledge Production in the Age of the Arab Spring.” The Journal of North African Studies 20(5): 702-721.

[10] Including, for instance, stressing that the Assad dictatorship is irreconcilable with the “values upon which the United States was founded,” as recognized by the lawmakers displaying “admirable ethics and courage” by supporting the Anti-Normalization Act. See: ‘Global Justice’ Applauds U.S. House Vote on Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023. 2024, February 19. Global Justice, https://globaljusticesyrianews.com/en/global-justice-applauds-u-s-house-vote-on-assad-regime-anti-normalization-act-of-2023/

[11] Ghanem, Mohammed Alaa. 2024, February 15. “Lawmakers Demand Accountability for Assad’s Crimes in Syria.” ACS Blog, https://acsyria.org/acs-blog/f/lawmakers-demand-accountability-for-assad%E2%80%99s-crimes-in-syria

[12] أحمد حافظ 2024, 24 مايو. النواب الأميركي يقر مشروع ميزانية للبنتاغون يحظر التطبيع مع الأسد. الجزيرة. https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2024/5/23/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D9%88%D9%86%D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B9-%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%88%D9%86

[13] See Rogin, Josh. 2024, April 30. “Biden is Letting Assad off the Hook, With Dangerous Consequences.” The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/04/30/biden-assad-syria-sanctions/

[14] Mohammed Alaa Ghanem on X/Twitter, 26 June 2024, https://x.com/MhdAGhanem/status/1805808562712854682; see also American Coalition for Syria (ACS) on X/Twitter, 27 June 2024, https://twitter.com/ACSyria/status/1806116286566400101. The relevant sections of the amendments to the budget bill H.R. 8771 read funding for the White Helmets is not just to “save lives of victims” targeted by Assad, Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah, but also “help prevent refugee flows by helping Syrians stay in their homes.” The stabilization funding aims for the Northwest aims to “counter Al Qaeda, Russia, Iranian backed militias, Hezbollah and the Assad regime.”  See See Committee on Rules. 2024, 25 June. “H.R. 8771 – Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2025. https://rules.house.gov/bill/118/hr-FY2025-SFOPS

[15] تلفزيون سوريا. 2024, 20 مايو. هل يدفع النظام ثمن قتل مواطن أميركي؟؟؟ | ما تبقى. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6UZNycrOT8&list=PLeMwite1QcQ18Wyj2Ied28RNwTWYkqYvB&index=14

[16] Secretary Antony Blinken on X/Twitter, 12 June 2024, https://twitter.com/SecBlinken/status/1800547299690680766

[17] Madaniya. 2023. Madaniya Booklet, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/63f530de48280472fa412b18/t/6645e5b4a854ba30ba47df33/1715856841667/Madaniya%27s+Mobilisation+Booklet-ENG-NOV23.pdf, p. 9.

[18] Atlantic Council. 2024. “Syria Strategy Project.” https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/middle-east-programs/syria-portfolio/syria-strategy-project/

[19] انظر: الجمهورية.نت. 2024, مايو 2. ما هو «مشروع إستراتيجية من أجل سوريا»؟

مقابلة مع الباحث والمحلل السياسي قتيبة إدلبي

[20] Lieffring, Christina. 2024, May 26. “Biden’s Support for Genocide May Cost Him Key Swing States.” Jacobin, https://jacobin.com/2024/05/bidens-trump-election-uncommitted-gaza-poll

[21] John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. 2008. The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. New York: Penguin.

[22] Mearsheimer and Walt, pp. 263-289.

[23] Vasanthakumar, Ashwini. 2021. The Ethics of Exile: A Political Theory of Diaspora. Oxford: Oxford University Press, Ch. 4.

[24] Reuters. 2012, March 13. “Syria Opposition Calls for Arab, Western Intervention.” https://jp.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE82B11K/

[25] شام العلي. 2024,13 يونيو. التجمّع ضرورة سياسية في الشتات؟ الجمهورية, https://aljumhuriya.net/ar/2024/06/13/%d8%b6%d8%b1%d9%88%d8%b1%d8%a9-%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d8%b3%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b4%d8%aa%d8%a7%d8%aa%d8%9f/

[26] Syrian American Council. 2024. “TPS for Syria: Resource Page.” https://www.sacouncil.com/tps_for_syria_resource_page

[27] Rashid, Hafiz. 2024, May 15. “Republican Congressman Joins Lindsay Graham in Calls to Nuke Gaza.” The New Republic, https://newrepublic.com/post/181580/republican-congressman-greg-murphy-nuke-gaza

[28] See Saleh, Layla. 2017. US Hard Power in the Arab World: Resistance, the Syrian Uprising, and the War on Terror. London: Routledge, especially Chapter 2-4.

[29] Syrian Negotiation Commission on X/Twitter, June 12, 2024. https://twitter.com/SyrianHNC_en/status/1800565682750558427

[30] Vasanthakumar, pp. 141-142.

[31] One example is the US support for Tibetan activists through the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020, which was motivated by American policy interests vis-à-vis China. See Vasanthakumar, pp. 141-2, 190.

[32] See for instance Klare, Michael T. 2023, November 7, “Biden’s ‘Rule-Based International Order’ Is Broken,” The Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/bidens-rule-based-international-order-is-broken/ and Mansour, Renaud. 2024, January 26. “Will the War in Gaza become a Breaking Point for the Rules-Based International Order?” Chatham House, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/will-war-gaza-become-breaking-point-rules-based-international-order, among many other commentaries.