Insights into the Key Developments Regarding the Syrian Issue in 2022

Summary:

The global changes, particularly the Russian war on Ukraine, had a significant impact on the overall situation in Syria in 2022. The previous year witnessed several developments in the positions of global and local actors regarding the Syrian file. The political deadlock persisted, fuelled by conflicting interests among global and regional actors, as well as the diminished influence of local actors and their limited scope of action. The new international approach in dealing with the Syrian issue, which began to emerge the previous year, solidified. This approach can be summarized as a shift from focusing on regime change and holding its leaders accountable to modifying its behaviour and seeking humanitarian and security approaches that serve the interests of engaged and affected actors in the Syrian war.

On the other hand, the resurgence of media momentum and international public opinion regarding the Syrian issue was not sufficient to prompt actors to adopt more serious positions that could end the suffering of the Syrian people. This momentum was fuelled by the scenes of the Russian war on Ukraine and the Russian army’s atrocities against civilians. It was also fuelled by the revival of the “Attadamun Massacre Video,” which contains footage of mass killings and massacres during the early years of the revolution in Syria. Despite this momentum, it remained within the realm of media engagement and the issuance of statements calling for the accountability of those responsible for these atrocities.

Also, within these dynamics, the visit of a “Hamas” delegation to Damascus and their meeting with the regime’s leadership is noteworthy. Although the impact of such a visit on the political, military, and overall situation in Syria is limited, it may contribute to establishing a general atmosphere conducive to the possibility of normalization with the Assad regime. This has also reflected in further erosion of Arab and Islamic public acceptance of Hamas’ recent alignment with Iran. Alongside this, there has been a repeated rejection by the United States and Europe of any normalization process with the Assad regime. This rejection has been evident in response to the Arab states’ normalization last year, Turkish statements, and even the visit of Hamas.

On the field level in Syria, the deterioration of the security situation and a series of mutual assassinations between parties dominated the scene in Daraa. Meanwhile, protests in Suwayda served as a manifestation of the tense and sporadically erupting situation. In northern Syria, despite the situation not escalating into an open military operation against Idlib province, artillery shelling and airstrikes persisted throughout the year, targeting residential areas, infrastructure, and humanitarian facilities, resulting in a significant number of casualties, especially in the Idlib countryside. Additionally, the attack by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on Afrin had negative repercussions. In northeastern Syria, tensions peaked and receded multiple times with each repetition of discussions about a Turkish military operation against areas under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). This was accompanied by escalating mutual shelling between the SDF and Turkish drones and points of the Syrian National Army on the other side.

In another context, ISIS cells continued to attack various targets in the Syrian desert and areas in eastern and northeastern Syria, employing guerrilla warfare tactics that the organization resorted to after the fall of its last stronghold in Baghuz. There has been ongoing discussion about the future of ISIS and its cells in Syria following the killing of two of its leaders in 2022 in separate operations by the US Army in northern Syria and other local groups in the south. Moreover, on the ground, the intensity of “Israeli” airstrikes on Iranian sites and its military militias in Syria has escalated. The airstrikes targeted Damascus and Aleppo international airports, rendering them out of service for several days. “Israeli” officials claimed that the attacks carried out by “Israel” in recent years have managed to destroy 90% of the Iranian military infrastructure in Syria.

On the internal front of the opposition factions and revolutionary forces, the state of fragmentation and the absence of a unifying umbrella continued to dominate the activities of various factions, components, and political entities. This was accompanied by significant developments in the control map, distribution, and alignments. Among these developments was the internal conflict between the components of the Third Corps and the Hamzat and Suleiman Shah al-Amshat brigades. However, the most significant development was the ability of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to enter the strategic area of Afrin in the northern countryside of Aleppo, taking advantage of the ongoing conflict among the components of the National Army. All of this was accompanied by the continued popular resentment and revolutionary dissatisfaction with the practices of various factions and components in the administrative and security sectors in various regions and cities.

On the humanitarian level, the appeals of volunteer and humanitarian groups and the reports of the United Nations that sounded the alarm about the humanitarian situation in northern Syria were not sufficient to find a sustainable formula for humanitarian intervention and meeting the needs of the displaced and refugees in camps. The issue of renewing the mechanism for delivering aid across the border remained trapped under the weight of Russian obstinacy, political bargaining, and the threat of a veto against it in the Security Council. There was a gradual alignment with the Russian vision of humanitarian intervention through contact lines and by delivering aid to the Assad regime, despite warnings from observers about the accelerated deterioration of the humanitarian situation and the lack of trust in the alternative Russian plan for aid, especially with the decline in humanitarian funding and the spread of diseases like cholera.

Read the full report (Arabic)