The Drug Trade, a card to recycle the Assad regime

Long before the Syrian revolution started in 2011, Syria was known as a cross point for the drug trade coming from Afghanistan and Iran. This drug smuggling network was supervised by personalities close to the Assad regime who were very active under the cover of some security intelligence branches. These networks established workshops for manufacturing drugs. Their production stayed limited and directed to domestic consumption^[1].

With the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, many drug dealers and smugglers participated in oppressing the protesters and later established an armed militia that participated in the military operations in favor of the Assad regime. After that, in 2013, drug dealing activities started to increase as it became one of the funding sources for the militias and military operations^[2].

This wasn’t the first time for the Assad regime to get involved in the drug dealing business. The Syrian regime used the unrest in Lebanon and the poor security conditions during the Lebanese civil war (1971-1991) and managed drug dealing in the region. That period made enormous profits for military and security personalities close to the Assad regime and fed the Lebanese conflict.

 After the Taef agreement ended violence in Lebanon, the Assad regime kept investing in the drug dealing file. It started implementing high-level attacks to brighten its image and control the situation in Lebanon at the end of 1997. The regime was then able to convince the American Administration to remove Syria from the list of drug-dealing countries and give it a commercial right to access the American exports and investments of American oil in return for waiving mass destruction weapons, economic emancipation, and the possibility of holding a peace agreement between Syria and Israel.

From a cross point to a center of manufacturing and production.

Syria started to export Captagon in 2013 in conjunction with the downturn of its official economy because of war, economic sanctions, and corruption inside the Assad regime. Therefore, Aleppo and Homs’ chemical factories were transformed into factories for these pills. Many resources reported that Assad forces and foreign militias related to Iran used drugs, especially Captagon, with their elements precisely in the front lines to encourage them to fight and overcome fear during battles, which made drug dealing very active in this period^[3].

A study issued by the Center of Operational Analysis and Research COAR states that the size of drugs coming from Syria, which were confiscated in years 2013-2015, increased 4-6 times compared to what it was in 2011. The amount decreased in the next two years that witnessed the most brutal military operations launched by the Assad regime to regain areas out of its control. (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Amount of Syrian drugs that were confiscated during smuggling processes estimated in Kilograms.

After the Assad regime managed to regain most of the areas out of its control in 2018, the drug trade moved to a new level. The size of confiscated drugs coming from Syria in 2018-2020 increased 6-21 times compared to its 2011 levels. The number of drugs manufacturing centers and workshops that worked domestically increased. Also, the smuggling processes and importing drugs from Lebanon or Iran increased as many shipments were confiscated. The methods of hiding drugs loads became more technically developed as well.

A local study states that it spotted 50 current locations for manufacturing drugs in Syria. There are about 14 centers for manufacturing Captagon, 12 for crystal meth^[4], and 23 for manufacturing Hashish. According to witnesses by arrested members of the Assad regime, the regime was able to penetrate areas that weren’t under its control utilizing weak security measures and recruited some members and established networks that promote and manufacture drugs and collect intelligence information. ^[5] (Table 1).

Type of the drug	Concentration areas	Areas under the control of:
		“Hizbullah”	Regime forces	SDF forces	Opposition forces
Captagon	Aleppo and Latakia and Syrian Lebanese broders.	5	8		1
Crystal meth	Daraa, As Suwayda, Damascus countryside and Syrian Lebanese borders.	5	5		3
Hashish	Daraa, Damascus countryside, Syrian Lebanese borders and countryside of Aleppo and Idlib.	7	9	3	4

Table 1:Locations and numbers of drug manufacturing workshops, according to a Jusoor Center study.

Narcotics leave Syria, especially Captagon shipments, moving towards three main destinations: North Africa, The Arabian Peninsula, and Europe.  The available evidence indicates that Europe is now a transit point for narcotic substances destined for the Middle East and North African markets^[6].

Economic effect of drug trade

It’s well-known that the Assad regime prevented people from returning to the regions it controlled. These regions became under the domination and administration of militias that supported the regime. For example, “Hizbullah” dominated the border regions in Homs’s countryside such as Al Qusayr, Al Zabadani, and Qalamun Mountains and invested their fertile lands in planting Hashish instead of allowing their owners to support them in agricultural projects that secure necessary foodstuffs.

With the economic collapse in Syria resulting from the policies of the Assad regime, the traditional economic activities declined for the benefit of the increase of drug manufacturing activities. This new growing business became a profitable sector that filled the pockets of those related to the Assad regime, its foreign allies, and modern war princes^[7].

On the other hand, many people involved in drug trafficking networks were rewarded, and a number of them became members of “parliament” with the regime’s support. This gave them impunity that facilitated their illegal works^[8].The amnesty decrees also included many of those involved in drug trafficking crimes[9]. They were released, while thousands of prisoners of conscience and political detainees are still missing in the dungeons, and there is no information about them^[10].

An investigation by “the New York Times” revealed that most drug production and distribution operations are carried out under the supervision of the 4th Armored Division in the Assad regime’s army. This is an elite force led by Maher al-Assad, the younger brother of Bashar al-Assad and one of the most influential figures in Syria^[11]. According to an investigation by the British newspaper “The Times” based on the testimonies of security officials in ten countries and experts in the drug trade, a group of businessmen with close ties to the Assad regime, the Lebanese “Hezbollah” militia, and other members of the Assad family who are protected by the regime are also involved in this trade^[12].

This network has benefited from all the resources of Syria, including human resources. They transformed pharmaceutical laboratories into workshops for manufacturing facilities^[13]. Warehouses and ports connected to shipping lanes in the Mediterranean were used along with smuggling routes to Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq and all that was under cover of the state^[14].

In addition, new manufacturing centers for Captagon were also established in small factories, built-in iron hangars, or abandoned villas where pills get manufactured using simple machines and under the security protection of the regime’s soldiers. Moreover, signs were placed in front of other facilities stating they are closed military sites. These sites are being used in manufacturing two types of Captagon pills, the first type is the one with low quality, and it is destined for local usage, and the price of the single pill is one dollar. The other high-quality type is destined for external markets where the single pill gets sold for 14 dollars^[15].

The size of the Syrian drug economy, especially the value of the Captagon pill trade in the country, is estimated at nearly 16 billion US dollars annually. This is three times the Syrian government budget for the year 2022. An analysis made by the Center for Operational Analytics and Research – (COAR) concluded that authorities, mainly in Europe and the Middle East and North Africa region, seized at least 173 million Captagon pills (34.6 tons) and 12.1 tons of Hashish that were exported from Syria in 2020. The market value of this confiscated quantity of Captagon pills is estimated at approximately $3.46 billion US dollars^[16].

Drug smuggling through Syrian agricultural or industrial exports made many countries stop importing Syrian and Lebanese products. This has deprived Syrians of a source of foreign currency that could have supported the dilapidated Syrian economy.

Drug trade and manufacturing gathered the allies, Iran, the Assad regime, and Hizbullah, on one interest in finding new funding resources that allow escaping sanctions, reaching new markets, and finding self-financing sources for the militias while securing foreign currencies^[17].

Drugs as a tool to subjugate society

Despite drug trading and manufacturing being prepared mainly for external export, the Assad regime flooded the Syrian society with its products that have low quality. Many people started using drugs to escape despair, hopelessness, a feeling of deformity, and torn economic conditions. By that, the Assad regime guaranteed the destruction of youth’s energy and their protests against him.

The Assad regime focused its efforts and used drugs as a weapon to destabilize the security of areas outside its control by recruiting some cells. This happened in areas controlled by the Syrian opposition, or in areas controlled by the “Syrian Democratic Forces – SDF”^[18], or even in the regions that got out of its control at a former time and then managed to recover it, or those whose loyalty was not guaranteed. Drug smuggling gangs have been active in both the governorates of As-Suwayda[19] and Daraa. These cells have become a center for transmitting information, planting explosives, and assassination operations, in addition to being a means of destabilizing economic and social security and preventing these communities from recovering^[20].

In addition to that, in the areas under the control of Assad’s forces, the spread of drug abuse and addiction among school students has become very common, both in middle and high schools and some sports clubs^[21]. The matter has turned into a common phenomenon in universities, especially among students at Damascus University^[22] and in the university city^[23], without any genuine government interest in controlling this phenomenon and protecting children or youth.

Some testimonies indicate a policy that seeks to implicate children and adolescents by encouraging them to become addicted at first by providing free samples to them by their colleagues who are already involved, and then using them in transportation, promotion, and selling processes as well as sexual exploitation^[24].

Despite all government allegations about raids and arrests of some drug promoters, these operations are symbolic, affecting only small promoters while leaving the personalities and sides that sustain this business. Even those small promoters get released after a short while to resume their activities once again^[25].

 Moreover, news from the Assad regime’s areas indicates the ease of obtaining drugs of all kinds through social media. The process starts by sending an encrypted message via WhatsApp through which an agreement is reached on the location of delivery and the required code. The delivery site is often one of the kiosks that are close to schools or public groceries, and delivery services to the customer are available in some cases.

Numerous news has spread indicating that the process of selling drugs has moved into a public form as they get sold in Damascus on stands, smoke kiosks^[26], or in gardens and by itinerant tea and coffee sellers spread on the streets under the watch and protection of some intelligence branches^[27].

Figure 3: One of the kiosks selling drugs near the National Hospital in As-Suwayda^[28]

On the other hand, drugs have been turned into an indirect means of recruiting young people, especially to the militias affiliated with Iran, as they exploit the addiction of young people and their inability to secure funds for drugs, tempting them with salaries and pushing them to join such militias. Joining these militias could be the alternative that guarantees a financial resource for youth through the royalties they receive at the checkpoints or in return for theft and thuggery operations. It also ensures protection for them and makes them escape conscription.

Moreover, civilians in areas where the militias that lead the drug trafficking operations are spread suffer from armed fights and disputes between different groups or the border guards. In these conflicts, the only victim is the civilians. At the beginning of 2020, the western Qalamoun region witnessed armed fighting between Hizbullah militia and the National Defense Army elements due to disputes over profits from drug and Hashish sales. Also, many residents of the towns on the Syrian-Jordanian border suffer from the spread of explosive bullets due to clashes between border guards and drug smugglers.

It is worth noting that many of the wounded who were injured in opposition-controlled areas during the previous years, when most of those areas were besieged, did not receive the required medical care. This made them addicted to strong-effect analgesic pills, the only alternative to relieve their pain. This matter developed with some of them, from just taking painkillers to abusing drugs or mixing them to alleviate the effects of their injury.

Moreover, centers specializing in treating addiction are absent from the area under the control of the Syrian opposition, despite the high incidence of drug abuse among different segments. This is mainly due to the lack of interest of supporters in this specific issue. Facing this phenomenon is only limited to some awareness sessions. There is no clear system to deal with cases of addiction as addicts often get prison sentences without any awareness or guidance for addicts to the treatment system, which explains the return of addicts to drug abuse after their release from prison.

The expected effects as a result for the escalation of drug trade in Syria

The Assad regime is excellent at using issues and complex cases to achieve political gains. It used the Lebanese civil war and drug trade during that period, the “Jihadist” file in Iraq, and then the file of “ISIS” and turned them into a tool to serve its objectives. Thus, it is not strange that the regime uses the drugs as a new card for negotiation to present itself as the sole partner who can control and contain the problem, which threatens local and regional security equally.

And it is not strange also that the Assad regime will continue sponsoring and investing in this trade that can secure cash liquidity that can enable those involved in it to circumvent the US sanctions imposed by the Caesar Act. The process of drug manufacturing and smuggling is expected to rise in the coming years to increase the return from it on the one hand and to compel regional and neighboring countries to restore relations with the Assad regime to control the borders and stop the passage of these shipments on the other hand.

As for the internal Syrian level, the drug trade will prolong the conflict in Syria, undermine the rule of law and impede the restoration of integrated economic performance. This dangerous business is transforming local and human resources from useful production to drug production and export, in addition to the bad reputation that has become chasing Syrian exports and the suspension of receiving Syrian exports in many countries. This means depriving the Syrian economy of foreign currency for a long time.

 With the absence of any government vision to stop the collapse of the Syrian economy and its preoccupation with illegal economic activities, millions of Syrians live within the cycle of poverty and extreme poverty where all essential and service commodities are absent. And under the Assad regime’s economic policies, it is expected that the situation of need will worsen. The rates of poverty and deprivation will increase as the drug trade revenues don’t go to the country’s safe but rather go to the pockets of the Al-Assad family and those who are close to them and get used to prolonging the conflict.

Thus, the situation of poverty and need will get worse. The Syrian government will announce its inability to assume responsibilities to attract more support and aid and increase allegations that this economic collapse is caused by external sanctions, ignoring its role in squandering the country’s resources and destroying the economy and infrastructure during the past years.

Syrians are already bearing enormous social consequences from the Assad regime, such as the loss of safety and the spread of corruption. In addition to that, we now see that schools and universities in the Assad-controlled areas have been transformed from a place that is supposed to seek to build people into a place where the energies of young people are wasted and destroyed. Also, social capital has been systematically squandered, depriving the country of competencies resulting from arrests and security pursuits. This changes the shape of the current society and its relations and makes the future of Syria bleak unless quick measures are taken to contain this problem and find solutions to it on the foreseeable and long-term level.

In particular, males of the military service age have become accustomed to the abuse of stimulants, including Captagon, after taking them during military operations. Cheaply manufactured narcotics are now among the few painkillers available to Syrians who face grinding multidimensional poverty with the collapse of the state around them. Many youths, adolescents, and women have moved from victims to promoters. Dealing with these segments will be one of the most challenging problems Syrians should be prepared for. These people will probably be fighting any future change processes or political transition.

It must be recognized that drug use in this context is a multifaceted socio-political issue with its roots in violence, institutional failure, humanitarian crisis, and personal desperation. Approaches based on mental health and psychosocial support may be critical starting points for addressing the root causes of drug abuse. But more important will be the restoration of livelihood opportunities and a way out of the despair that has become a mark of daily life for many Syrians.

The effect of this trade is reaching not only Syria’s Neighboring countries and the Middle East, but European countries as well which happen to be one of the main destinations for many of the Captagon shipments coming out of Syria, and this trade’s profits which known as the black money are used in carrying terrorist operations in the region.

Starting with a political solution in which the Assad regime does not have a role is the primary way to save Syria’s downfall and protect its youth from turning into mercenaries in Iran’s cross-border project. The Assad regime has proven for years that it is an unreformable regime. It’s a regime that can cross all humanitarian and legal boundaries, relies on alliances, invests in problems, and exports them to neighboring countries in a way that serves its interests, even if it was at the expense of millions of Syrians.

On the other hands, sanctions on their own are not sufficient in putting an end to the Syrian regime’s violations. What is needed much more now is to use these sanctions to put enough political pressure on the Assad regime, and to push for a political solution under the UN resolutions.

The Syrians came out in 2011 and made many sacrifices for their country to turn into a model in which citizens are respected, their rights are preserved, and to turn into active, influential, and productive individuals. However, the course of events and foreign military interventions turned the conflict into a place for settling international accounts. Also, the inability of the international community to intervene effectively and the stagnation for years turned the Syrians into victims, increased their suffering, and enabled the Assad regime to exploit them widely.

Syrians need to mobilize all efforts to stop the Assad regime and prevent more crimes. Keeping Assad apart from the accountability circle means its continuation in committing these crimes and the increase of its victims. This will encourage other dictator regimes to follow the same policy and place more burdens on the international community in dealing with the renewable problems. This undermines world peace and makes a recovery and stability in Syria challenging to achieve.

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